Spark

1. Business / Trading Name: Spark New Zealand Limited (trading as “Spark”; formerly Telecom New Zealand until 2014).

2. Company Number: 328287.

3. NZBN: 9429039661098 .

4. Entity Type: NZ Limited Company.

5. Business Classification: Telecommunications services (not elsewhere classified) – ANZSIC code J580910.

6. Industry Category: Telecommunications and digital services.

7. Year Founded: 1987 (incorporated 24 February 1987).

8. Addresses:

• Registered Office / Address for Service: Level 1, 50 Albert Street, Auckland 1010, New Zealand.

• (Formerly at Spark City, 167 Victoria Street West, Auckland.)

9. Website URL:

https://www.spark.co.nz

(consumer site) and

https://www.sparknz.co.nz

(corporate site).

10. LinkedIn URL: https://www.linkedin.com/company/spark-new-zealand.

11. Company Hub NZ URL: https://www.companyhub.nz/companyDetails.cfm?nzbn=9429039661098.

12. NZ Companies Office URL: https://app.companiesoffice.govt.nz/companies/app/ui/pages/companies/328287

13. Social Media URLs:

• Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/spark4nz/

• Twitter (X): https://twitter.com/SparkNZ

• Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/sparknz

14. Ultimate Holding Company: None – Spark New Zealand is a publicly listed standalone company (no parent entity).

15. Key Shareholders: Highly dispersed public ownership via institutional custodians. Major stakes (as of recent filings) include Milford Asset Management (~5.2%), Accident Compensation Corporation (~5.2%), and BlackRock funds (~3.3%). The majority of shares are held by various nominee companies (e.g. HSBC, JPMorgan, Citibank custodial accounts), reflecting large institutional and index investors. (No single shareholder has a controlling stake.)

16. Leadership:

Board Chair: Justine Smyth (appointed 2011, Chair since 2017) – a prominent director also involved in charities and Auckland Airport.

Chief Executive Officer: Jolie Hodson (CEO since mid-2019) – previously CFO, she leads Spark’s current strategy.

Board of Directors: Includes Jolie Hodson, Warwick Bray, Sheridan Broadbent, David Havercroft, Gordon MacLeod, Lisa Nelson, and Justine Smyth (a mix of former telecom executives and experienced company directors from NZ and abroad).

Executive Team: Key executives under Hodson include Stewart Taylor (Finance), Mark Beder (Technology), Matt Bain (Marketing), Melissa Anastasiou (General Counsel), etc..

17. Staff: Approximately 5,300 employees (FY2024), making Spark one of New Zealand’s largest private employers. Staff range from technicians and call-centre workers to IT professionals and corporate staff.

18. Staff That Have Held Previous Government Roles:

Sir Roderick Deane – Chief Executive 1992–1999, was previously a top public servant (Reserve Bank Deputy Governor and State Services Commission Chairman), exemplifying the public-to-private “revolving door.”

Conor Roberts – Head of Public Affairs at Spark (2016–2019), had been a political advisor (chief press secretary to Auckland’s Mayor) before joining Spark, highlighting recruitment of insiders with government experience. (No known former Ministers or MPs have been directly employed by Spark, but the company has hired ex-government advisors for lobbying and communications roles.)

19. Past Employees:

Theresa Gattung – CEO 1999–2007, oversaw Telecom during its monopoly era; infamous for admitting that telcos “used confusion” as a marketing tool, which drew rebuke from the Prime Minister.

Dr Paul Reynolds – CEO 2007–2012, brought in from BT (UK) to manage Telecom’s operational separation and the Chorus demerger, leaving after successfully delivering the split.

Simon Moutter – CEO 2012–2019, led the rebrand to “Spark” and a pivot to digital services; known for aggressive cost-cutting and for championing wireless and streaming ventures.

Sir Roderick Deane – CEO 1992–1999 (and later Chairman), architect of Telecom’s early strategy post-privatisation; a former economist who applied pro-market principles but was criticised for profiteering from a privatised utility.

(These and other former executives often feature in New Zealand’s business elite, with some moving into other major companies or public roles after Spark.)

20. Clients: Spark’s customer base spans almost every sector of New Zealand. It provides mobile, internet, and IT services to:

General Public: Millions of consumers and households nationwide (Spark has ~2.7 million mobile connections and 687k broadband customers).

Government: Core telecommunications supplier to government agencies – e.g. holds All-of-Government contracts for mobile and data services. Notably, Spark (with a partner) delivers the new Public Safety Network for NZ emergency services. Its subsidiary Revera has major public-sector clients, such as District Health Boards for cloud infrastructure.

Corporates: Many of NZ’s largest companies (banks, retailers, utilities) use Spark for connectivity and data services. For example, Spark’s ICT arm services clients in finance, agriculture, and transport with cloud and security solutions. (Client specifics are rarely disclosed due to commercial sensitivity, but Spark’s market share and involvement in critical infrastructure make it a key provider to most sectors.)

21. Industries/Sectors Represented: Spark operates and advocates primarily in the telecommunications, internet, and digital technology sector. Its business touches the mobile, broadband, IT services (cloud computing, cybersecurity, data centres), and media/content streaming industries. (Through subsidiaries like Spark Health and Spark IoT, it is also involved in health tech and Internet-of-Things sectors.) In effect, Spark represents the telecom and tech industry’s interests in policy discussions.

22. Publicly Disclosed Engagements: Spark has recently committed to greater transparency around its lobbying. In May 2023 it adopted a Public Policy and Lobbying policy pledging to disclose all industry association memberships and any lobbyists or consultancy firms it engages, including the purpose of such engagements. (As of this report, Spark’s website does not list specific lobbyist details; the company has stated it will make such disclosures in its future governance reporting.) Spark routinely makes formal submissions on government consultations (e.g. to the Commerce Commission and parliamentary committees on telecom regulation), which are publicly available. However, beyond required disclosures, historically much of Spark’s political engagement (meetings with ministers, etc.) has not been voluntarily disclosed due to the absence of a mandatory lobbying register in New Zealand.

23. Affiliations: Spark is an active member of multiple industry bodies and advocacy groups:

New Zealand Telecommunications Forum (TCF): The industry association for telco operators – Spark is a founding member, using it to self-regulate and lobby as a united industry.

GSMA: The global mobile network alliance – Spark is a member of the GSMA, aligning with international mobile policy and standards efforts.

New Zealand Internet Task Force: A cybersecurity information-sharing forum – Spark participates to shape internet security policy.

BusinessNZ and TechNZ: Spark engages with general business advocacy groups. (It is understood to be part of BusinessNZ’s Major Companies Group, and it partners with NZ Tech industry initiatives, though it isn’t publicly listed, likely to inform broader economic policy debates.)

TUANZ: The Telecom Users Association – Spark interacts with TUANZ (though TUANZ often advocates against Spark’s position on behalf of consumers).

(These affiliations give Spark channels to influence policy collectively and signal its public commitment to industry best practices.)

24. Sponsorships / Collaborations: Spark leverages sponsorships as both marketing and influence tools:

Spark Arena: Naming-rights sponsor of Auckland’s 12,000-seat Vector Arena since 2017 (renamed “Spark Arena”), positioning the brand prominently in NZ’s largest city and partnering with Live Nation on technology upgrades at the venue.

Sports & Events: Through its now-defunct Spark Sport platform, Spark partnered with sports bodies (cricket, rugby, Formula 1) to stream events, in collaboration with state broadcaster TVNZ – a venture that brought it into the realm of sports politics and broadcasting rights.

Spark Foundation: The company’s charitable arm collaborates with government and NGOs on digital inclusion programs (e.g. “Skinny Jump” low-cost broadband for disadvantaged families). This allows Spark to co-brand with public sector initiatives on bridging the digital divide.

Tech Incubators & Startups: Spark has run “Spark Lab” innovation workshops and sponsored startup competitions/accelerators to promote entrepreneurship (garnering goodwill in the tech community).

Community Infrastructure: Collaborations with local councils for free public WiFi (e.g. in phone boxes) and with Civil Defence on emergency texting systems underscore Spark’s integration into public services.

25. Events (organised by Spark): Spark hosts and funds events that often have political or industry influence dimensions:

Spark Accelerate” Conference: An annual technology forum for business and government stakeholders – for instance, Spark Accelerate 2024 featured Spark’s leaders and partners discussing AI adoption in NZ, with key public-sector attendees. Such events serve to shape the narrative on digital policy and position Spark as a thought leader.

Launches & Roadshows: Spark’s product launches (e.g. 5G rollout events) double as lobbying opportunities, with ministers invited to share the stage and endorse new infrastructure.

Industry Roundtables: Spark executives frequently speak at or host roundtables on topics like rural broadband, cybersecurity, or 5G spectrum – indirectly influencing policy by convening stakeholders.

(These events help Spark cultivate relationships with officials and frame policy issues in its favour, under the guise of neutral “industry discussion.”)

26. Political Donations: None – Spark New Zealand (and its subsidiaries) formally do not donate to political parties. The company’s Board-approved policy explicitly forbids political donations in New Zealand or abroad, reflecting a stance to avoid direct financial influence. (No public records of any party donations from Spark or Telecom exist in recent years. Any past token donations, if made, were below disclosure thresholds. Spark instead channels its influence through lobbying and advocacy, not party funding.)

27. Controversies:

Monopoly Abuses: Telecom/Spark has a long record of alleged anti-competitive conduct. Notably, Telecom was fined a record NZ$12 million in 2009 for abusing its market power (“data tails” price squeeze). Earlier, in 2006, Telecom faced government intervention after CEO Theresa Gattung admitted using customer confusion as a “marketing tool” – a remark that underscored Telecom’s exploitative tactics and prompted a sharp rebuke from the Prime Minister.

Regulatory Showdowns: Telecom consistently fought against regulation – delaying local loop unbundling of broadband until the mid-2000s, and controversially trying to charge rivals extra for dial-up internet in the late 1990s (“0867” scheme). Its intense lobbying and behind-doors pressure on ministers in those years were widely criticised as undermining competition. In 2013, post-split, Spark itself ran a populist campaign (“Be Counted”) to oppose a government plan that would have kept broadband prices high for consumers to benefit Chorus. This highly political campaign – effectively lobbying the public to pressure MPs – drew criticism for its alarmist tone (yet ultimately influenced the Government to moderate its position).

Consumer Law Breaches: Spark (via Spark Trading Ltd) has been prosecuted for misleading customers. In 2019 it was fined $675,000 under the Fair Trading Act for overcharging ~72,000 customers and false billing practices. Earlier, Telecom was fined $500,000 in 2007 for a misleading “unlimited broadband” offer. Such cases portray a pattern of sharp commercial practice skirting legality.

Huawei 5G Ban: In November 2018, New Zealand’s GCSB (spy agency) barred Spark from using Huawei equipment in its 5G network rollout on national security grounds. Spark had to exclude its long-time Chinese supplier, a decision entangled in Five Eyes geopolitical pressure. Spark publicly expressed disappointment but complied. The incident was controversial as it placed Spark at the center of NZ–China relations; Spark had lobbied for a risk-based approach, but ultimately the Government’s security stance prevailed.

Network Failures: Public outrage hit Spark in Sept 2019 during the Rugby World Cup streaming – its Spark Sport service suffered outages during an All Blacks match. Although not a deliberate influence act, the high-profile failure dented Spark’s credibility in the eyes of officials and the public.

COVID-19 Response: During the 2020 pandemic, Spark faced criticism for connectivity issues as people worked from home. It also controversially decided against seeking wage subsidies (unlike some competitors), which drew praise from some quarters as responsible, but also highlighted its robust financial position.

(Overall, Spark’s history is dotted with legal and ethical controversies reflecting tensions between its profit-driven ethos and its public service responsibilities.)

28. Other Information of Note:

Privatisation & Rebrand: Spark’s journey from a government department to a public company is a defining part of NZ’s economic reforms. Privatised in 1990, Telecom was for years the sharemarket’s star performer – but also the poster-child for “privatised monopoly” issues. In 2014, the company rebranded from Telecom to Spark in a bid to shed its legacy image and signal a new tech-oriented strategy. This costly rebrand (and name change) was effectively an integrity exercise following years of public distrust; it marked a cultural shift to appear more customer-centric, though skeptics saw it as cosmetic “integrity-washing.”

Market Position: Spark remains one of New Zealand’s largest listed companies by market value and is often among the top 5 on the NZX50 index. Its influence is not just political but economic – it is widely held by KiwiSaver funds and ACC, meaning many New Zealanders’ pensions ride on Spark’s fortunes. This interweaving of public interest and private profit sometimes blurs lines: government regulators must police a company that is partly owned (via funds) by government entities and citizens.

Chorus Demerger: Spark’s structural separation in 2011 (spinning off Chorus Ltd to own the fixed network) was a landmark in NZ telecom policy. While intended to remove Spark’s monopoly, Spark cleverly turned it into a win-win – shareholders got Chorus shares and Spark avoided tougher regulation. This strategic pivot allowed Spark to focus on mobile and digital services. It also meant Spark’s lobbying focus shifted to new fronts (spectrum allocation, mobile competition) post-2011.

Subsidiaries: Spark operates several subsidiaries (Spark Health, Spark IoT, Computer Concepts Ltd (CCL), etc.) which sometimes fly under the radar in influence. For instance, Spark’s venture arm co-invests with government innovation funds, and CCL (acquired in 2015) works closely with public agencies on cloud projects. These extensions of Spark broaden its touchpoints with policymakers (e.g. participating in digital economy working groups).

Integrity Initiatives: Spark publishes annual sustainability reports and claims adherence to ethical conduct codes. It has anti-bribery policies and has not been tainted by corruption scandals. Its 2023 lobbying transparency pledge came as Parliament debated regulating lobbyists – suggesting Spark is attempting to get ahead of possible rules by self-regulating. Critics note that such voluntary measures, while positive, depend on good faith and are hard to verify without an official register.

29. Recipient of Wage Subsidy Scheme: No. There is no record of Spark New Zealand (or its group) receiving the COVID-19 Wage Subsidy in 2020–21. Spark’s revenues were stable through the pandemic and it opted not to seek government wage support, unlike many companies. (This spares Spark the reputational issues faced by firms that took subsidies and later paid dividends.)

Sources:

1. “SPARK NEW ZEALAND LIMITED – NZ Limited Company (Company No. 328287, NZBN 9429039661098) – Previously Telecom Corp of NZ,” NZL Business Directory, https://www.nzlbusiness.com/company/registered/Spark-New-Zealand-Limited

2. “SPARK NEW ZEALAND LIMITED (Cr No. 328287) – Registered 24 Feb 1987, Addresses,” NZWAO Company Directory, https://www.nzwao.com/companies/spark-new-zealand-limited/

3. “Justine Smyth | Spark NZ – Board Chair Biography,” Spark New Zealand, https://www.spark.co.nz (accessed via Google cache)

4. “Spark New Zealand – LinkedIn profile (About, Website, Industry, Founded),” LinkedIn, https://nz.linkedin.com/company/spark-new-zealand

5. “Public Policy and Lobbying Commitment (May 2023) – Spark NZ (Board-approved policy PDF),” Spark New Zealand, https://www.spark.co.nz/content/dam/spark/documents/pdfs/governance/Public_Policy_and_Lobbying_Commitment_(May_2023).pdf

6. “Conor Roberts – Head of Public Affairs (2016–2019) at Spark New Zealand,” LinkedIn Profile Summary, https://nz.linkedin.com/in/conorgeorgeroberts (via Google snippet)

7. Peter Nowak, “Telecom competitors hit back,” NZ Herald, 11 May 2006 (reporting PM’s rebuke of Theresa Gattung’s ‘confusing customers’ speech) – via NZ Herald Premium Archive.

8. “Spark fined $675,000 for misleading consumers,” NZ Commerce Commission – Media Release, 12 Apr 2019, https://comcom.govt.nz/news-and-media/media-releases/2019/spark-fined-$675,000-for-misleading-consumers

9. “New Zealand bans Spark from using Huawei for 5G – GCSB cites security risk,” ZDNet, 28 Nov 2018, https://www.zdnet.com/article/new-zealand-gcsb-bans-spark-from-using-huawei-for-5g

10. “Be Counted campaign clocks up 1,000th submission,” Scoop News, 8 Nov 2013, https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1311/S00364 (Spark’s Conor Roberts quoted on public submissions vs ComCom copper pricing)

11. Sophie Boot, “Spark acquires naming rights to Vector Arena,” BusinessDesk via Scoop.co.nz, 10 May 2016, https://business.scoop.co.nz/2016/05/10/spark-acquires-naming-rights-to-vector-arena/

12. “Major shareholders: Spark New Zealand Limited,” MarketScreener, retrieved Nov 2024, https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/SPARK-NEW-ZEALAND-LIMITED-17184664/company/ (listing ACC 5.21%, Milford 5.24%, BlackRock 3.3% etc.)

13. “Spark New Zealand Limited – 2024 Annual Report (financial highlights),” Spark Investor Centre, Aug 2024, https://investors.sparknz.co.nz/ (revenue NZ$3.861b, net earnings NZ$316m for FY24)

14. “Spark is the largest telecommunication and digital services company in NZ… Formerly state-owned Telecom, went public 1990 and rebranded Spark in 2014,” World Benchmarking Alliance – Digital Inclusion Benchmark (Spark profile), 2023, https://www.worldbenchmarkingalliance.org/publication/digital-inclusion/companies/spark-2/

15. “Telecom NZ fined NZ$12 million in old court case (price squeeze),” Reuters, 9 Oct 2009 / updated 15 Dec 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/telecom-nz-fine-idUSSGE6BE02K20101215

16. “Preparing for 5G in New Zealand – Māori spectrum allocation,” Radio Spectrum Management (MBIE), updated 2022, https://www.rsm.govt.nz/projects-and-auctions/completed/Preparing-for-5G-in-New-Zealand (overview of 3.5GHz allocation with Spark, Vodafone, 2Degrees and Māori share)

17. “Crown signs over quarter share of 5G spectrum to Māori,” NZ Herald, 30 May 2023, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/crown-signs-over-quarter-share-of-5g-spectrum-to-maori/HV5BWT5AJ5BH7N5I6V4L5Y7QB4/

18. “Wellington, July 2 – Telecom confirms Dr Paul Reynolds ended tenure as CEO; Chair thanks him for delivering structural separation,” Reuters (Press release text), 1 Jul 2012 (via Thomson Reuters Trust Principles archive)

19. “Revera signs major cloud contract with Waikato DHB – will migrate 700+ applications to its Government IaaS Cloud,” DatacenterDynamics, 31 Oct 2017, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/revera-signs-major-cloud-contract-with-waikato-district-health-board/

20. Bryce Edwards, “The Hugo Group – Unauthorised Lobbying Register entry (excerpt: Spark New Zealand … Recipient of Wage Subsidy Scheme: No record of this.),” The Democracy Project – Integrity Institute, Oct 2023, (via substack snippet)

21. “Spark New Zealand – Wikipedia page,” Wikipedia, last updated Nov 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spark_New_Zealand (general reference for company history, employee count, market position)

22. “Record Commerce Act penalty against Telecom for price squeeze,” Commerce Commission (NZ), 15 Dec 2010, https://comcom.govt.nz (High Court imposed $12m on Telecom for 2001-04 data tails abuse)

23. “Telecom CEO to leave at end of June,” NZ Herald, 2 May 2012, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/telecom-ceo-to-leave-at-end-of-june/R74UQSURJFF72HAEALET55AZGI/ (noting Reynolds oversaw Chorus split)

24. Roderick Deane – Biography, Te Ara Encyclopedia of NZ, updated 2010, http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies (mentions Deane’s public service roles and Telecom leadership)

25. “Lobbying: the hidden ecosystem beneath the Beehive,” Te Ao News, 21 May 2023, https://www.teaonews.co.nz (general article on NZ lobbying, references influence of large corporates like Spark)

Spot anything in this entry that is wrong? Please either leave a comment at the end or email, in confidence: bryce@democracyproject.nz

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