Food & Grocery Council

1. Business/trading name: New Zealand Food & Grocery Council Incorporated (NZFGC) – an incorporated society acting as the industry association for food, beverage and grocery product suppliers.

2. Company number: Registered as an incorporated society (non-profit). (A specific society registration number is not readily public; a business number is used instead.)

3. NZBN: 9429000014571 (New Zealand Business Number, a unique identifier for the council).

4. Entity type: Incorporated society, not a company limited by shares. It operates as a non-profit membership organisation.

5. Business classification: Industry association for food, beverage & grocery product manufacturing and distribution.

6. Industry category: Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) – representing manufacturers of packaged food, drinks (including non-alcoholic and alcoholic beverages), and other grocery goods sold in supermarkets.

7. Founded: circa 1989. The first chief executive, Brenda Cutress, served 20 years up to 2009, indicating the council’s establishment in the late 1980s. It was originally known as the NZ Grocery Marketers Association.

8. Purpose: The council defines itself as a “strong voice for fast-moving consumer goods.” Its ultimate economic interest is in maintaining a profitable, minimally impeded operating environment for the companies it represents. That includes advocating for low import tariffs, science-based (rather than precautionary) food regulations, and favourable tax settings.

9. Addresses: Physical: Level 6, Dimension Data House, 99-105 Customhouse Quay, Wellington 6011. Postal: PO Box 25-420, Wellington 6146. Phone: +64 4 470 7725. Email: admin@fgc.org.nz.

10. Official website URL: fgc.org.nz

11. LinkedIn URL: linkedin.com/company/new-zealand-food-grocery-council. (The LinkedIn icon on the FGC’s own site links to its profile.)

12. Company hub NZ URL: nz.centralindex.com/company/472966443819008/new-zealand-food-grocery-council-incorporated – a directory listing with address and contact info.

13. Companies Office URL: companiesoffice.govt.nz/…/New-Zealand-Food-Grocery-Council-Incorporated (on the Incorporated Societies Register.) An official registry entry containing governance and filing details). (In the absence of a direct link, the entity can be found via the Companies Office societies search by name.)

14. Social media URLs: X: @NZ_FGC. YouTube: youtube.com/channel/UC (FGC channel for webinars and events). LinkedIn: (see above). (The council does not appear to maintain a public Facebook page, focusing on LinkedIn, Twitter and YouTube for outreach.)

15. Ultimate holding company: Not applicable. The council has no holding or parent company – it is “committee-managed” by its members.

16. Membership: As a non-profit society, the FGC has members instead of shareholders. As of 2023 it reported more than 100 member companies, collectively accounting for 95% of supermarket supplier sales. This membership includes many of the country’s largest food, drink and grocery product manufacturers (eg, Nestlé, Coca-Cola, Fonterra Brands, Heinz Watties, Goodman Fielder) as well as major beer and wine producers.

17. Leadership: The current chief executive is Raewyn Bleakley, who has been in the job since October 2022. The board – chaired since 2019 by the managing director of Heinz Watties, Mike Pretty – is composed of senior executives from member companies, maintaining the ‘proud FGC tradition of being chaired by leaders of prominent companies.’

18. Staff: A small secretariat on the order of five to 10 core staff, augmented by industry working group participants from member companies.

19. Clients: Not applicable in a commercial sense. The council does not have “clients” as a consultancy would – its members are its constituents and its activities are funded by and conducted on behalf of those companies (which could from one perspective be viewed as “clients”).

20. Industries/sectors represented: Manufacturers and suppliers of food, beverages, grocery and household products – essentially the fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) sector, which covers anything provided to supermarkets and food retailers. The sector accounts for 45% of New Zealand manufacturing by income and a significant share of exports (more than 60% of merchandise exports in value).

21. Publicly disclosed engagements: Regular submissions to Parliament and regulators on proposed laws, regulations and inquiries (eg, the Commerce Commission’s supermarket study). Representatives appear in select committee hearings and stakeholder consultations, often advocating industry positions on food safety, labelling, trade, and competition issues. From time to time the council is also formally represented on government advisory groups such as the Food Safety Advisory Board. Its executives meet with ministers and officials (though New Zealand has no mandatory lobbying disclosures, such meetings are occasionally referenced in media statements). Major statements and announcements are made publicly on the FGC website and in media releases.

22. Affiliations: The NZFGC is the sister organization of the Australian Food & Grocery Council (AFGC), and often collaborates with it on trans-Tasman issues. It is a member of the international Consumer Goods Forum and works with global industry coalitions on standards and sustainability. Domestically, it partners with other sector associations (eg, the Alcohol Beverages Council); maintains links with BusinessNZ; and has worked on projects with groups like the Retailers Association. The council is also affiliated with the Trading Partner Forum (a joint supplier-retailer platform) and other working groups that include supermarket companies, aiming to improve industry practices (eg, barcoding, logistics and safety).

23. Sponsorships/collaborations: The FGC often sponsors or co-sponsors industry awards/events (eg, categories in the NZ Food Awards and conferences on packaging). The council and its members have joined initiatives such as the Be Treatwise programme (educating consumers about treat foods), which it administers; and it has worked with government on Healthy Kids campaigns and reformulation targets (voluntarily reducing salt and sugar in products). It also sponsors research and scholarships in food technology and supports the University of Auckland’s food process engineering scholarships.

24. Events: The flagship event is the annual conference; there are also biannual member meetings and an AGM. The council runs the Kaleidoscope Future Leaders’ Forum (a talent development event for young professionals in the FMCG) and seminars/webinars on topics like digital labelling, sustainability and supply chains (often in response to current issues). It’s also involved in events with external partners, such as joint retailer-supplier forums (for example, workshops on the new Grocery Code of Conduct). Council representatives have spoken at parliamentary functions and Commerce Commission briefings on the grocery sector.

25. Political donations: No direct political donations by the council are publicly recorded. As an industry association, it does not typically donate to political parties. However, many of its member companies and their executives do (eg, food and alcohol corporates have contributed to major parties’ funding, as per Electoral Commission disclosures). This indirect influence is notable but cannot be attributed to the FGC as an entity.

26. Other information of note: The FGC’s influence was evident in the Commerce Commission’s 2020–22 market study of the grocery sector. It actively participated, submitting evidence of supplier issues and pushing for a mandatory code of conduct. It celebrated the commission’s final report as a “victory for suppliers,” saying this vindicated its long-held stance on the supermarket duopoly’s power.

It is also noteworthy that when the Labour government in 2023 created the post of Grocery Commissioner, the inaugural appointee was Pierre van Heerden, a former chair of the council.

27. Recipient of wage subsidy scheme? Yes. The council applied for and received subsidies under the Covid-19 Wage Subsidy Scheme in 2020. Public disclosure of the amount received – approximately $655,000 – indicated that it claimed support for retaining its staff during pandemic lockdowns. (The substantial amount suggests it claimed for multiple staff across the subsidy iterations.)

The acceptance of such subsidies by a lobbying organization drew some public attention, though the council was eligible, as its revenue (funded by member dues) was presumably impacted by the pandemic. Many other industry bodies also sought subsidies, seeking to avoid layoffs in 2020. Many of the FGC’s member companies also received them in their own right.

PART TWO: ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Executive summary

Founded in the late 1980s, the Food & Grocery Council has developed into a powerful voice for supermarket suppliers and more than 100 food, beverage and consumer goods manufacturers, including global giants and major New Zealand firms. Operating at the nexus of industry and government, it has championed industry-friendly approaches such as voluntary codes and self-regulation, and helped drive the adoption of a mandatory code of conduct and the appointment of a Grocery Commissioner to address the supermarket duopoly’s power.

The council has also been embroiled in controversy – most notably the 2014 Dirty Politics scandal. Key council figures have exemplified the “revolving door” between government and lobbying. The council’s close ties with political insiders have both bolstered its influence and raised questions of conflict of interest.

Financially, it is backed by lucrative grocery interests and has drawn on public funds such as Covid wage subsidies to sustain its operations.

In terms of transparency, the council discloses basic information (submissions, some partnerships) but much of its advocacy is done behind closed doors. Comparatively, it stands out among lobby groups for its blend of corporate clout and political savvy, arguably paralleling the influence of sector lobbies like those for the alcohol and dairy industries. Overall, its lobbying power is significant – it has achieved key policy wins for suppliers, yet its methods (at times opaque or aggressive) highlight ongoing concerns about the transparency and ethics of industry influence in New Zealand.

1. Historical background and growth

The Food & Grocery Council was born out of the perceived need for a united voice for food and grocery product suppliers. Founded around 1989, initially as the Grocery Marketers Association, in its early years it focused on liaising with retailers and responding to new regulations. Under the two-decade leadership of Brenda Cutress it grew in stature alongside the expanding supermarket sector. As the grocery market consolidated during the 1990s-2000s, and chains like Progressive Enterprises and Foodstuffs gained dominance, suppliers banded together under the council to ensure their interests were represented.

The appointment of former National MP Katherine Rich as chief executive in 2008 marked a new era of professionalized lobbying. Rich’s political pedigree signalled the council’s evolution from a trade group to a sophisticated advocacy organization. Under her leadership from 2009 to 2022, it broadened its agenda (taking on health policy debates, international trade issues etc), while the membership base grew to encompass not just food companies but also non-food grocery manufacturers and big beverage/alcohol firms.

Achievements over that time included the adoption of front-of-pack nutrition labelling (the “Health Star Rating” system which the council helped to ensure was an industry-friendly voluntary scheme), consultation on the food safety law reform of the early 2010s, and increasing policy alignment with the FGC’s Australian counterpart. By the time Raewyn Bleakley took over as CEO in late 2022, the council was a heavyweight lobbying entity, credited with bringing supplier issues like supermarket fairness to the fore.

2. Influence on policy and politics

The council’s lobbying and advocacy span several fronts: competition policy, food regulation, trade rules, health and nutrition policy, and more. It has consistently raised concerns about the imbalance of power between suppliers and the supermarket duopoly, pushing for reform years before the issue got political traction. In 2014, for instance, when Countdown was accused of bullying suppliers, the council publicly highlighted the “power imbalance” and called for better negotiating conditions. This set the stage for later policy responses.

Lobbying positions often mirror the commercial priorities of the FGC’s largest members. For example, when Coca-Cola faces a threat of sugary drink regulation, the council mobilizes correspondingly. If dairy exporters worry about overseas standards, it raises the matter with trade officials.

In regulatory affairs, the FGC makes submissions on nearly every law or regulation affecting the food industry, from labelling standards to environmental packaging rules. Known for its access to decision-makers, it arranges meetings between its members and ministers, provides industry briefings to MPs, and has some ability to place its people on government working groups. A notable example is Katherine Rich’s appointment in 2012 to the Health Promotion Agency board, which literally gave the industry a seat at the health policy table. Former government officials and people with political backgrounds are often hired as staff or engaged as consultants.

The organisation has shown it can apply pressure indirectly as well. During debates on so-called junk-food marketing restrictions, its lobbying in favour of self-regulation contributed to the government opting for partnerships with industry rather than strict bans in some cases.

The FGC’s power lies in being the go-to representative for a huge sector of the economy, which gives it credibility and clout in policy discussions. This economic footprint gives it serious leverage: policy-makers know that decisions affecting this sector can impact investment decisions and potentially thousands of jobs (everyone from factory workers to farmers). It's a potent narrative in political lobbying, implying that what’s good for FGC companies is good for the economy.

Ministers and agencies often consult it on prospective changes, essentially allowing the industry a hand in drafting rules. This close involvement can border on regulatory capture; indeed, critics say the council has at times stymied more aggressive health regulations (such as a sugary drinks tax) through its political influence.

In sum, the FGC’s lobbying footprint is wide: it has influenced competition law, food safety standards, labelling and marketing rules, trade negotiations and even education campaigns. By balancing public-facing cooperation with hard-nosed behind-the-scenes lobbying, it has become a fixture in the political landscape, directly or indirectly shaping legislation and regulation to align with its members’ interests.

3. Key figures and their political/corporate ties

The FGC is no stranger to the revolving-door syndrome. Katherine Rich stands out: a former National Party MP who left Parliament in 2008 and the next year became the council’s chief executive. Rich’s political background gave her a formidable network – she had personal relationships with sitting ministers and MPs, which she leveraged to lobby effectively (John Key’s government notably trusted her perspective, even defending her dual role amid conflict claims). Under Rich, the FGC’s strategy often mirrored political campaign tactics, unsurprising given her experience. She is now the chief executive of BusinessNZ.

Another key figure was Rich’s predecessor, Brenda Cutress, who though less publicly known was influential in building the council and serving on government advisory boards through the 1990s–2000s. The current CEO, Raewyn Bleakley, was a senior manager with the Transport Agency and has also held roles with the Hospitality Association, the Bus and Coach Association and Fire and Emergency.

FGC board members are typically corporate chief executives or general managers of major food companies, but some have notable government connections. Pierre van Heerden, a Sanitarium executive who chaired the board between 2013 and 2016, was appointed Grocery Commissioner in 2023 – essentially moving from lobbying to regulation. This appointment was controversial to some, given he came from the very industry he’d now be required to regulate, but the FGC lauded it as a wise choice.

Veronique Cremades-Mathis (board chair in 2016, during her six-year tenure as head of Nestlé NZ) had less direct government roles but was a prominent corporate figure interfacing with officials on trade and health (Nestlé being involved in health star labelling discussions etc).

Other previous chairs include a former Goodman Fielder managing director, Tim Deane, and a former Fonterra Brands chief executive, Peter McClure.

The council’s lobbying operations also once involved Carrick Graham, not an FGC staffer per se but a hired PR consultant. The son of a former cabinet minister, he was well-connected in political circles. His secret work countering health advocates (see below) exemplifies the FGC’s use of politically savvy operatives to advance its agenda off the record.

On the governmental side, having Rich on the Health Promotion Agency board from 2012 to 2015 was a prime example of overlap: she was essentially a lobbyist embedded in a Crown entity, which raised conflict questions that went to the Auditor-General. Although the official conclusion was that her conflicts were manageable, public perception was that industry had a foot firmly in the door of public health governance.

Furthermore, a former judge, Sir John Hansen, was at one point enlisted by the FGC to conduct an internal inquiry into the Dirty Politics allegations – lending judicial gravitas to a political PR issue (in the council’s view, the inquiry “vindicated” Rich). This demonstrates how the FGC can draw in high-profile figures to protect its reputation. The interplay of roles is also evident in member companies, many of which hire former government political staff as lobbyists.

4. Notable lobbying efforts

One of the council’s most significant campaigns has been its long fight over supermarket regulation. For more than a decade, it gathered evidence of the two main chains’ practices regarding suppliers (such as retrospectively charging them or forcing favourable terms). It lobbied quietly for a code of conduct, taking cues from the UK and Australia, and pronounced itself “delighted” when the Commerce Commission’s grocery market study report in 2022 echoed many of its recommendations.

Specifically, the council’s lobbying contributed to the Labour government agreeing in 2023 to implement a mandatory Grocery Supply Code of Conduct and to establish a Grocery Commissioner to enforce fair dealings. This is a major policy impact directly traceable to years of FGC advocacy (often behind closed doors in consultations, but also via public submissions and media statements calling out Foodstuffs’ and Woolworths’ “unconscionable conduct”).

The FGC has also been successful in opposing restrictive public health regulations. It has consistently campaigned against proposals like a sugar tax on soft drinks, stricter “junk-food” advertising rules, and mandatory front-of-pack warning labels. In these cases, it often coordinated submissions and media responses claiming such measures would unfairly penalize manufacturers or be ineffective.

A concrete instance in 2018–19: when health advocates pushed for labelling added sugars on foods, the FGC lobbied government to delay or water down the idea. The result: New Zealand (unlike some countries) still does not have mandatory “high sugar” warning labels.

Similarly, the council was part of a food industry coalition that volunteered the Health Star Rating system – a move widely seen as pre-empting the possibility of traffic-light labels or compulsory warnings. By championing such a system (which is industry-supported), the FGC secured a framework more favourable to producers.

In the realm of trade, it played a key role during negotiations for international agreements like the (since abandoned) Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). It lobbied trade officials to secure outcomes beneficial to food exporters (many FGC members are big exporters of groceries) and ensure that any TPP provisions wouldn’t mandate anti-obesity measures.

On ingredient regulation, the council’s lobbying has left a mark. One case was the debate over folic acid fortification in bread: initially mandated in 2009, it was postponed after industry pushback (the baking industry and the FGC raised concerns). It wasn’t until 2021 that fortification became mandatory – a delay partly attributable to early lobbying creating political hesitancy.

The council has also run positive campaigns, eg, by pushing for stronger penalties for food tampering after incidents of contamination, which the government acted on.

Another major lobbying success was convincing the government to conduct a market study into supermarkets in the first place – something the council quietly advocated, and which was launched in 2020. Its lobbying ensured the recommendations favoured by suppliers were front and centre in the study’s final report, and more radical measures (like breaking up the chains) were toned down or withdrawn.

The council’s impact is also seen in parliamentary submissions and select committees: MPs’ questioning sometimes mirrors its talking points, indicating the council’s influence in shaping the narrative. For example, in a 2018 inquiry into obesity, some MPs echoed industry arguments against sugar taxes – a line the FGC had disseminated in its materials.

Connections to political parties are nuanced: the council stays officially non-partisan, but has historically found a sympathetic ear in the National Party. Under National-led governments from 2008 to 2017 it enjoyed a light-touch regulatory approach. Even so, it cultivated relations across the aisle; by 2020, the Labour-led government was working closely with it on the supermarket competition issue.

There are also links with think-tanks and advocacy groups: the council has been associated with the Food Industry Group (an alliance to counter health lobbyists), and it indirectly supported platforms like the Taxpayers’ Union in opposing sugar taxes. When a policy threat or opportunity is identified, it invariably mounts a thorough campaign – combining direct lobbying, public messaging, third-party allies and often overseas examples – to defeat the threat. The results, from the code of conduct to stalled health regulations, demonstrate its adeptness at translating lobbying into policy impact.

The council’s strong opposition to sugar taxes and its aggressive lobbying against mandatory labelling have also drawn criticism that it prioritizes corporate profits over public health.

5. Financial and business interests

The council’s power is underpinned by the financial backing of its member companies, which collectively account for tens of billions of dollars in annual sales and exports – more than 5% of GDP and nearly half of manufacturing output. The council itself operates on a modest budget ($1–1.5 million annually), funded by membership fees scaled to company size. Major multinationals likely contribute the lion’s share. No regular government funding is received, just specific project grants, so it is fundamentally an industry-financed body. The profits and revenues of individual members translate into lobbying resources – when the industry is doing well, the council can invest more in advocacy (such as commissioning research or hiring high-profile consultants). Conversely, it argues that overly burdensome regulation could harm those profits and by extension the economy – a common refrain in its lobbying.

The council does not hold government contracts per se, but it occasionally secures government commissions: for example, in 2021 the Ministry for the Environment contracted it to co-lead the Plastic Packaging Stewardship co-design, which likely came with funding.

While the council itself has no shareholders, many of its members are subsidiaries of global corporations (Nestlé, Unilever etc), so its agenda is at least partly influenced by international business interests. Opposition to, say, plain packaging or digital marketing curbs is often aligned with global corporate stances. Some member companies have interlocking ownership (eg, domestic firms owned by Australian parents).

Another aspect is investment: many member firms invest in local manufacturing plants; NZFGC warns that “onerous” regulation (like strict environmental packaging laws or marketing bans) could deter future investment or drive companies offshore, thus influencing politicians who seek to keep industry money onshore.

Finally, government procurement or contracts are minimal in this sector (unlike, say, construction) – although one exception is that some members supply food to government entities (schools, hospitals).

6. Controversies and ethical considerations

In 2014, Nicky Hager’s book Dirty Politics revealed that the FGC under Katherine Rich had hired PR consultant Carrick Graham to covertly attack public-health critics. Emails showed Graham paid blogger Cameron “Whale Oil” Slater to publish slanted articles undermining health advocates who promoted ideas like sugar taxes and restrictions on “junk food” advertising. Graham’s firm was paid $365,000 over five years, during which defamatory blog posts targeted health experts like Professor Doug Sellman in an effort to discredit them.

This scandal led to calls for Rich’s resignation from the board of the Health Promotion Agency on the grounds of conflict of interest but the government of the day opted not to remove her. She denied wrongdoing and the FGC stated that it “did not pay anyone to write stories on its behalf” on Whale Oil, though it acknowledged employing Graham. Both the council and Rich were sued for defamation by health advocates; the case was settled confidentially in 2020 with no public apology. Co-defendants Slater and Graham eventually apologized in court in 2021. This episode exposed the FGC’s hidden PR tactics and raised concerns of unethical lobbying.

Another controversy arose in 2014 when Labour MP Shane Jones accused supermarkets of extortion. Some speculated the FGC’s close ties with major brands made it initially reticent to publicly condemn supermarket abuses of power, until Jones’s revelations forced the issue.

The council’s activities have raised ethical questions and concerns about conflicts of interest, highlighting the thin line between robust advocacy and undue influence. A glaring instance was the Dirty Politics affair: hiring a PR operative to run secret smear campaigns against public health officials and campaigners. That suggests a level of deception and intimidation in lobbying that goes beyond acceptable practice.

While the FGC denied direct involvement in defamatory blogging, the evidence that it funded those efforts tarnished its credibility in the eyes of many. It was essentially an attempt at indirect lobbying (or sabotage) – influencing public opinion and political climate by attacking the messengers (health advocates) rather than engaging in open policy debate. This is a form of “black ops” lobbying widely viewed as unethical.

Another conflict example was Rich’s dual role as FGC chief executive and member of the Health Promotion Agency. Here, a person responsible for promoting public health was simultaneously representing companies selling alcohol, snacks and sugary drinks – products often counter to public health goals. The Auditor-General found no clear breach of rules, but flagged how perceptions of regulatory capture can arise. Indeed, health groups saw Rich’s involvement with the agency as compromising its integrity.

This reflects a broader issue: regulatory capture, whereby industry insiders hold positions on regulatory or advisory bodies overseeing that industry. The council has benefited from such capture – besides Rich, Pierre van Heerden’s appointment shows the potential for industry-friendly oversight.

Transparency gaps are also notable. The council does not publicly disclose all its lobbying meetings or funding for third-party advocacy. In a country with no official lobbying register, interactions like the FGC’s meetings with ministers are not automatically made known to the public. This obscurity was exploited in the Whale Oil case – the council’s role would have remained secret without leaked emails. Additionally, funding is not transparent beyond broad membership figures; the proportions contributed by, say, Coca-Cola vis-a-vis a smaller firm aren’t known. If a few large multinationals dominate funding, they might dictate the agenda – something not visible externally.

Potential conflicts of interest also arise when FGC staff and board members come from companies that may have their own agendas. While the council claims to form consensus positions, there could be behind-the-scenes tension or conflict when, for example, a big soft-drink company’s interest in blocking sugar regulation might clash with a cereal company’s interest in fortification. How those are resolved internally isn’t disclosed, leaving a question of whose interest prevails – presumably the biggest players’.

On the ethical front, the FGC often touts an “evidence-based approach” in its advocacy. However, critics accuse it of cherry-picking evidence to suit industry – for instance, by funding studies that downplay links between sugar and obesity, then using the studies to argue against regulation).

The council makes no political donations but member companies might sponsor political events or provide hospitality to MPs (dinners, sports tickets etc), and the council could facilitate such access. Without disclosure, this can be seen as buying influence. At times, the FGC’s strategy of promoting industry-friendly alternatives like self-regulation codes can be viewed as attempting to forestall democratic policy-making – some call this “soft capture” or “integrity-washing”.

Conflicts of interest are also evident when it lobbies on issues like alcohol – as a food council representing some alcohol producers, it opposed alcohol advertising restrictions around schools. Some would argue it should recuse itself from debates that are purely about alcohol harm, as alcohol isn’t core food – but it did get involved, likely prioritizing member interest over strict alignment of mandate.

Finally, accountability is a concern: when the council influences policy-making that later proves detrimental to the public interest (say, by delaying health measures), it faces little accountability, since it operates in the shadows of formal government processes. The public cannot vote out a lobby group. This asymmetry – high influence with low accountability – is at the heart of ethical critiques of the FGC.

In conclusion, while lobbying is a legitimate activity, the council’s case illustrates the risks of ethical pitfalls. Post-Dirty Politics it has taken steps to repair its image (eg, by emphasizing its constructive partnerships), but questions remain about how candid it is willing to be regarding its lobbying tactics and potential conflicts. Greater transparency (such as voluntarily publishing meetings and refraining from covert PR) would improve trust, but as of now, given past behaviour, not everyone is comfortable with its “Trust us, we know best” approach.

7. Overall assessment of influence

The Food & Grocery Council is widely regarded as one of the country’s most powerful industry groups, on a par with the likes of BusinessNZ and the dairy and alcohol lobbies. It has highlighted competition issues in the grocery market and achieved policy changes benefitting both suppliers and consumers. It has also shown willingness to collaborate with government on solutions to issues like plastic packaging. It provides a channel for policy-makers to hear from the entire supplier industry, which arguably improves policy quality – rather than government dealing with dozens of individual companies, the council synthesizes and presents unified positions.

However, any assessment of its lobbying power must acknowledge its opacity and occasional aggressiveness. Its ability to operate out of public view – lobbying ministers privately, influencing through informal networks – means its power is not readily apparent to the average New Zealander. Yet, as the Dirty Politics exposé showed, it can move the levers of influence decisively from the shadows. In terms of transparency, it could do much more.

The council does publish its formal submissions on its website and engages in some media dialogue, but there is no detailed disclosure of meetings with officials, funding of advocacy efforts, or the extent of coordination with allies. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to fully trust that its influence is always wielded appropriately. By comparison, in countries with lobbying registries (like Australia or the US), similar food industry councils must log their lobbying contacts and sometimes the money spent. New Zealand has no such requirement, so the FGC’s activities go largely unscrutinized.

In terms of raw lobbying effectiveness, it has a strong track record: it has largely achieved its preferred outcomes on many issues, and even when public pressure overwhelms its arguments after long battles, it sometimes succeeds in delaying measures or watering them down. Comparatively, though smaller than broad business lobbies such as BusinessNZ or sectoral ones like Federated Farmers, the council’s influence is outsized relative to its size. In part, this is because it deals with consumer products that are politically sensitive (food prices, health, manufacturing jobs), giving it many touchpoints with policy. It also tends to forge alliances: for instance, on health issues it might quietly support the messaging of the Alcohol Beverages Council or the tobacco industry, thereby amplifying a pro-industry front.

A fair evaluation is that the council’s lobbying power is robust and occasionally controversial, but also nuanced. It has shown the capacity for both constructive engagement and hard-nosed lobbying. Its transparency is limited, which can undermine public trust – as was evident when the secret tactics of the Dirty Politics scandal came to light. Since then, the FGC appears to have pulled back from such tactics, focusing on reputation-building and “good news” stories instead. This is itself a form of influence – shaping the narrative to frame the industry as a constructive partner, not an adversary.

In conclusion, the FGC commands significant lobbying power in New Zealand’s policy landscape. It operates in a system that affords lobbyists considerable access with few disclosure requirements, and it capitalizes on that. Its influence is likely to persist, given the importance of its sector – but there are calls (from public interest groups) for greater transparency and even a formal register of interactions to ensure that this influence is visible and accountable. Until such transparency is standard, it will continue to exert a largely behind-the-scenes sway on policies that affect what New Zealanders eat, drink, and pay at the checkout.

Bibliography

• New Zealand Food & Grocery Council – official website and publications (fgc.org.nz)

• Companies Office Register – NZBN and corporate information

• Otago Daily Times, “Katherine Rich moving to Wellington” (27 Nov 2008)

• NZ Herald, “Junk food ads to be banned…”, incl. remarks on FGC membership (5 May 2018)

• Radio NZ News, “Investigation into supermarket chain” (20 Feb 2014)

• Radio NZ News, “Rich ‘vindicated’ by food council inquiry” (30 May 2018)

• The Spinoff, “The scandal that lurks beneath the dirty politics trial” (Simon Wilson, 14 Mar 2021)

• NZ Herald, “Lobbyist appointment no conflict – Key” (Isaac Davison, 25 June 2012)

• Wellington Scoop, “Katherine Rich stands firm… allegations of conflict” (20 Aug 2014)

• Scoop News, “Heinz Wattie’s boss Mike Pretty to chair FGC” (9 Apr 2019)

• FMCG Business, “NZ Food & Grocery Council elects new Chair” (13 Apr 2016)

• NZ Treasury (Aus), NZFGC Submission on Grocery Code (12 Sep 2014)

• Commerce Commission NZ, Market Study Final Report (Mar 2022) – Supplier issues and NZFGC input

• Health Coalition Aotearoa, “Dirty PR exposed in Whale Oil defamation trial – Media Release” (Mar 2022)

• NZ Parliament OAG Report, “Health Promotion Agency – Katherine Rich – possible conflicts” (2015)

• Ministry for Primary Industries, “Food industry associations” – NZFGC listing (2020)

• FYI.govt.nz (OIA), Appendix: COVID-19 Wage Subsidy recipients (2020)

• NZ Herald, “Dirty Politics: ‘NZ’s Watergate’” (2014) and related reportage on FGC/WhaleOil

• NZFGC Press Releases via Scoop InfoPages (2017–2021)

• Auditor-General’s comments on industry conflicts in health sector (2015).

Spot anything in this entry that is wrong? Please either leave a comment at the end or email, in confidence: bryce@democracyproject.nz