BNZ
1. Business / Trading Name: Bank of New Zealand (BNZ)
2. Company Number: 428849
3. NZBN: 9429039342188
4. Entity Type: NZ Limited Company
6. Industry Category: Financial Services (Banking)
7. Year Founded: 1861 (established by NZ legislation in 1861)
8. Addresses: Registered Head Office – Level 4, 80 Queen Street, Auckland 1010, New Zealand.
Po: Private Bag 39806, Wellington Mail Centre, Lower Hutt 5045, New Zealand.
9. Website URL:
https://www.bnz.co.nz
10. LinkedIn URL: https://www.linkedin.com/company/bankofnewzealand
11. Company Hub NZ URL: https://www.companyhub.nz/companyDetails.cfm?nzbn=9429039342188
12. NZ Companies Office URL: https://app.companiesoffice.govt.nz/co/428849
13. Social Media URLs:
• Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/BNZBank
• Twitter (X): https://twitter.com/BNZ
• Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/bnzbank/?hl=en
• YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/bnzbank
14. Ultimate Holding Company: National Australia Bank Limited (NAB) – incorporated in Australia (ACN 004 044 937). BNZ has been a wholly owned subsidiary of NAB since 1992.
15. Key Shareholders: National Australia Gr mited – holding ~87.8% (multiple share parcels) ; BNZ Income Management Limited – holding ~12.2%. (Both are NAB group entities; effectively 100% NAB ownership.)
16. Leadership: Chair – Warwick Hunt (appointed Chair June 2024; also a non-executive director of NAB). Chief Executive Officer – Dan Huggins (CEO since Oct 2021). Other board directors include Barbara Chapman (former ASB CEO), Kevin Kenrick (former TVNZ CEO), Linley Wood. Board and executives have deep banking and corporate backgrounds, with NAB representation at board level.
17. Staff: Approximately 5,000 employees in(2023). BNZ’s staff span nationwide branch teams, corporate offices in Auckland and Wellington, and specialist units (IT, risk, etc.).
18. Staff With Previous Government Roles: BNZ’s Executive Dean Schmidt (Executive, Commercial Services & Responsible Business) is a former advisor in the offices of Prime Minister Helen Clark and Minister Tony Ryall. Several board members have held public-sector roles: e.g. former Chair Doug McKay was the inaugural Chief Executive of Auckland Council (2010–2013) ; Director Barbara Chapman served on the Prime Minister’s Business Advisory Council and the Reserve Bank Act Review Panel. Director Linley Wood is a government-appointed director of NZ Post (a state-owned enterprise). These examples illustrate a revolving door between BNZ leadership and public roles.
19. Past Employees: Notable former BNZ leaders include Andrew Thorburn (BNZ CEO 2008–2014, later CEO of NAB, who resigned amid an Australian inquiry in 2019) ; Anthony Healy (CEO 2014–2017, later NAB executive) ; Angela Mentis (CEO 2018–2021, moved to NAB as Chief Digital Officer). Past BNZ Chairman Kerry McDonald (1990s) and directors Sir Michael Fay and David Richwhite were involved in the contentious 1990 bailout and “Winebox” tax scandal (see Controversies). Long-serving economist Tony Alexander (Chief Economist 1994–2019) was a prominent public commentator on housing and monetary policy. These alumni often remained influential in finance or public life after BNZ.
20. Clients: BNZ serves a wide range of clients across personal, business, corporate, and institutional banking. Retail clientsr a million individual New Zealanders for everyday banking, mortgages, and savings. Corporate and institutional clients span sectors such as infrastructure, government agencies, agriculture, and property finance. For example, BNZ is banker to various mid-to-large NZ companies and has provided services to public entities (BNZ historically held government accounts in the 19th century, and today competes to service local councils and state-owned enterprises). BNZ also offers wealth management (KiwiSaver retirement funds, through BNZ Investment Services) and previously provided life insurance (via BNZ Life, sold in 2022). In essence, its “clients” are broad-based: from individual depositors and borrowers to SMEs and lons. (BNZ’s client list is not publicly disclosed due to banking confidentiality.)
21. Industries/Sectors BNZ primarily represents the banking and financial services sector. As one of NZ’s largest banks, it is a key voice (often through industry bodies) on issues affect payments, and investment*. Its operations touch many sectors: e.g. BNZ finances a significant share of the housing and real estate sector (mortgages), agribusiness sector (farm loans), commercial property and infrastructure projects, and consumer finance. In lobbying contexts, BNZ’s interests align with large financial institutions – advocating for the banking industry’s perspective on regulation, capital requirements, credit laws, and economic policy. (It does not lobby on behalf of outside clients, but rather on its own behalf and as part of the banking industry.)
22. Publicly Disclosed Engagements: BNZ occasionally discloses its input to policy reviews and inquiries. Recent examples include:
• Commerce Commission (2023–24): BNZ made a formal submission on the regulator’s draft report into competition in personal banking. (In this April 2024 submission, BNZ disputed findings of weak competition, defending the status quo.)
• Reserve Bank Consultations: BNZ (often via the NZ Bankers’ Association) has published responses to RBNZ’s consultations – e.g. on bank capital requirements (2019), and on the Deposit Takers Act (deposit insurance scheme).
• Select Committee Appearances: BNZ executives have appeared before Parliament’s Finance and Expenditure Commitstance, during reviews of banking regulation or inquiries following the Australian Royal Commission findings in 2018). These appearances are minuted publicly, albeit not frequently.
• Official Information Act Releases: Ministerial show BNZ officials meeting with ministers occasionally, but these are not systematically published. (For example, media reported BNZ’s CEO met alongside other bank CEOs to discuss COVID-19 economic responses.)
BNZ does not maintain a voluntary lobbying disclosure register. Its engagements are mostly funneled through industry associations or consultation processes rather than standalone public lobbying declarations.
23. Affiliations: BNZ is a member of all major industry bodies and networks relevant to banking influence:
• New Zealand Bankers’ Association (NZBA): BNZ is a core member of the NZBA, the industry lobbying group for banks. (BNZ’s CEO has periodically chaired NZBA on a rotating basis.)
• BusinessNZ & Major Companies Group: BNZ is listed as a member of BusinessNZ’s Major Companies Group, aligning it with broad business advocacy on economic policy.
• The New Zealand Initiative: BNZ is a corporate member/supporter of this pro-business public policy think tank (BNZ Director Barbara Chapman serves as Deputy Chair of NZ Initiative). This affiliation connects BNZ to policy research and lobbying on economic reforms.
• Trans-Tasman Business Circle: BNZ participates in trans-Tasman business forums and is intertwined with its Australian parent’s affiliations (NAB’s influence networks often encompass BNZ).
• Payments NZ: BNZ is a stakeholder in Payments NZ (governing payment system rules) along with other banks.
• Advertising Standards Authority (ASA): BNZ is a member via the Financial Services Federation for industry self-regulation of marketing.
These affiliations amplify BNZ’s voice in collective lobbying efforts and “integrity initiatives” of the finance sector.
24. Sponsorships / Collaborations: BNZ has engaged in high-profile sponsorships and collaborative programs which can burnish its public image and networks:
• Sports Sponsorship: BNZ was naming-rights sponsor of the Crusaders Super Rugby team from 2016 through 2020, with the team even branded the “BNZ Crusaders.” (BNZ maintained sponsorship support even amid brand reviews in 2019.) This sports partnership gave BNZ visibility and goodwill across a major fan base in NZ rugby.
• Community Volunteering – “Closed for Good”: BNZ runs an annual nationwide volunteering event called Closed for Good. On this day, BNZ closes all branches so ~550 staff can volunteer in local communities. Touted as “New Zealand’s largest volunteer day” by BNZ, it has been held in various years (e.g. 2011–2013, 2016, 2023) to support schools, charities and community projects – enhancing BNZ’s socially responsible image.
• BNZ Literary Awards: Historically, BNZ sponsored literary competitions such as the BNZ Katherine Mansfield Short Story Awards (an annual award BNZ ran for decades until ending it in 2013).
• Economic Events: BNZ economists host regular client briefings and public seminars. BNZ has sponsored events like economic outlook breakfasts for businesses, and partnered with Chambers of Commerce on SME events.
• Innovation Programs: BNZ has collaborated on fintech and startup initiatives – for example co-sponsoring start-up competitions (like a past “Start-Up Alleion hub in Wellington (“BNZ Partner Centre”) to engage with entrepreneurs.
• Charitable Partnerships: BNZ collaborates with NGOs such as Plunket (parenting support), the Salvation Army (financial literacy programs), and others via donations or joint community programs. It also established a BNZ Community Fund in recent years to grant funds to local community projects (overseen by the BNZ Foundation).
• Industry Collaborations: BNZ works with other banks on sector-wide progthe Banking Ombudsman Scheme for dispute resolution, shared anti-fraud campaigns via NZBA, and the Regional Banking Hubs trial – a collaboration to maintain services in towns after branch closures).
These sponsorships and partnerships serve both philanthropic ends and strategic PR, embedding BNZ within influential social and business networks.
25. Events (Organised by BNZ): BNZ hosts and funds events that can indirectly advance its influence:
• BNZ Private Capital Forum: A yearly forum launched by BNZ to connect high-potential NZ businesses with private investors. The forum, run by BNZ’s Private Bank/Wealth team, invites selected entrepreneurs to pitch ilitating these investor–company linkages, BNZ positions itself as a critical intermediary in private capital markets (and builds relationships with growing firms and influential investors).
• Economic Update Roadshows: BNZ’s Chief Economist and research team conduct nationwide roadshows (luncheons, webinars) for clients and local business leaders, discussing the economic outlook. These events (often in partnership with local business associations) help BNZ shape economic narratives and stay close to policymakers and business stakeholders informally.
• Industry Conferences: BNZ sponsors and speaks at banking and finance conferences. For instance, BNZ executives have presented at the annual NZ Banking Summit and at regulatory conferences (providing an opportunity to influence thought leadership in the sector).
• Political Party Functions: While not openly advertised, BNZ representatives attend political fundraising party conferences as observers/sponsors. (Banks traditionally buy tables at election-year business dinners, etc., though BNZ itself avoids partisan profiling.)
• Community Events: Through its branches, BNZ holds local seminars on topics like fraud prevention for seniors, home-bughts, etc., which double as community outreach and lobbying for goodwill.
• Internal VIP Events: periodically hosts closed-door networking events with key government and business figures – e.g. an annual Chairman’s dinner – strengthening BNZ’s relational influence (details are not public).
26. Political Donations: None disclosed. BNZ (and parent NAB) have a stated policy against political donations. NAB ceased all political contributions from 2016 onward to avoid any perception of seeking political favours.as not appeared in New Zealand’s published party donation returns in recent years. Any minor donations by individuals associated with BNZ (board members or executives acting privately) have been below disclosure thresholds. Overall, BNZ’s influence on politics is exerted through lobbying and relationships rather than direct donations. (During the 2020–2023 election cycles, BNZ confirmed it made no donations to political parties or candidates.)
27. Controversies:
• Near-Collapse and Bailouts (Late 1980s–1990): BNZ suffered major losses from bad loans in the late 1980s. In 1989–90 it was effectively insolvent, forcing the government to bail it out twice – first injecting $634 million, then $720 million (with a private co-investor) to keep BNZ afloat. This bailout, and the associated dealings with prominent investors Fay Richwhite, was highly controversial. It led to taxpayer losses (the government later sold BNZ to NAB in 1992 at a price that could have been much higher absent the crisis). The BNZ failure became a textbook case of banking mismanagement and regulatory failure in NZ.
• “Winebox” Tax Evasion Scandal (1990s): BNZ was embroiled in the 1994–1997 Winebox Inquiry, which investigated complex tax avoidance schemes. In the 1980s BNZ (in partnership with Fay Richwhite) had used a Cook Islands offshore vehicle (European Pacific) to facilitate transactions that generated bogus tax credits – effectively avoiding NZ taxes. While prosecutions didn’t result, the inquiry exposed BNZ’s role in aggressive tax avoidance and raised allegations of cover-ups. The scandal tarnished BNZ’s reputation and highlighted cosy relationships between BNZ’s then-owners, accountants, and officials.
• Structured Finance Tax Avoidance Case (2000s): BNZ was one of four big banks caught using “structured finance” transactions to avoid NZ taxes in 1998–2005. In 2009, the High Court found BNZ’s transactions were illegal tax avoidance, potentially exposing BNZ to NZ$654 million in back taxes and interest. BNZ (and other banks) ultimately settled with Inland Revenue, paying hundreds of millions (BNZ’s share of a $2.2). A High Court judge criticized the schemes as lacking commercial purpose beyond tax avoidance. This case forced BNZ to concede wrongdoing and pay one of NZ’s largest-ever tax settlements.
• Misconduct Exposed by Australian Royal Commission (2018): As BNZ is NAB-owned, revelations of misconduct at NAB and other Australian banks reverberated in NZ. The Australian Royal Commission found widespread “unconscionable” practices – e.g. charging fees to deceased clients – at the parent banks. BNZ publicly distanced itself, but the same cultural issues were under scrutiny in NZ. A 2018 regulatory review in NZ found no systemic misconduct but did flag complacency. It was noted as “naïve to believe New Zealand’s system is different” without proof. This was a reputational hit by association and led BNZ to remove sales incentives and strengthen conduct risk oversight (to pre-empt scandals).
• Anti-Money Laundering Breaches (2018–2020): In 2022 the Reserve Bank issued BNZ a formal AML/CFT warning for failing to report over 50,000 transactions properly under anti-money laundering law ems did not capture the accurate location of a large volume of cash deposits between Nov 2018 and Apr 2020, due to a technical error. While BNZ self-reported and fixed the issue, regulators noted it as a significant compliance lapse. The incident – alongside similar breaches by other banks – showed BNZ had “struggled to comply” with AML rules, raising concern it could be used by criminals. RBNZ chose to warn rather than fine BNZ, but emphasised the seriousness of compliance obligations.
• Branch Closure Backlashes (2020–2021): BNZ provoked public and political ire by closing 38 branches nationwide in 2020–21, many in small towns. This broke an earlier promise not to shrink regional branch presence, prompting criticism from local mayors and senior citizens’ groups. The closures were seen as prioritising profit over community access to banking. In 2021, after pressure, BNZ paused further closures. By 2024, BNZ even announced a “u-turn” – extending branch hours again, implicitly acknowledging misjudgment of public sentiment. The episode dented BNZ’s image, casting it as out-of-touch with rural customers (and became a talking point for politicians concerned about essential services in regions).
• Historic Security Failures: In 2012, BNZ had a high-profile IT outage where customers couldn’t access funds for days, prompting RBNZ to critique banks’ tech resilience (all big banks have had similar issues). BNZ was also found in 2008 to have inadequate risk models, causing an RBNZ capital add-on. While not scandals per se, these technical failings attracted regulatory attention and public frustration.
• Customer Refund Incidents: BNZ, like other banks, has periodically had to refund customers for errors – e.g. in 2015 it refunded ~$15 million after discovering it failed to cancel insurance policies as requested. In 2020 it refunded ~$1m for wrongful fees on home loans. Though relatively minor, such incidents show operational lapses affecting customers.
• Pandemic Response Controversy: During COVID-19 (2020), BNZ benefited from central bank liquidity support and government loan guarantees. While it did not require a bailout, BNZ faced criticism for large profits and dividend payouts while many businesses struggled. BNZ did n wage subsidy, which avoided direct controversy, but its decision to continue paying NAB large dividends during a pandemic (after RBNZ lifted dividend restrictions) was questioned in media commentary.
Each controversy has, in different ways, fueled public and political skepticism about BNZ’s conduct and the adequacy of banking regulation – reinforcing calls for greater oversight and transparency.
28. Other Information of Note:
• Market Position: BNZ is one of NZ’s “Big Four” banks which collectively hold ~85% of the nation’s bank lending market lds roughly 20-25% market share in key segments (e.g. ~BN$90 billion in assets). This oligopolistic dominance is a focal point for regulators and is pertinent to BNZ’s influence – it is a systemically important bank.
• Financial Performance: BNZ has been highly profitable. For the year ending September 2024, BNZ made a net profit of about NZ$1.5 billion (near record levels, even as the economy slowed). High profits, coupled with high interest margins, have drawn criticism that the big banks exploit a lack of competition. BNZ’s profitability also gives it resources to invest in lobbying and influence efforts.
• Brand and Public Image: BNZ brands itself with the Māori name “Te Pūke o Aotearoa” and promotes commitments to diversity and sustainability. It achieved the “Rainbow Tick” for LGBTQ+ inclusion and touts support for **Cl t its financed emissions). Skeptics label some of these as “integrity washing,” suggesting BNZ’s public initiatives (while positive) also serve to offset or distract from less publicly palatable lobbying it undertakes behind closed doors.
• Role in COVID-19 Recovery: BNZ was a participant in the government’s Business Finance Guarantee Scheme (providing loans to pandemic-hit firms, 80% government guaranteed). It worked closely with Treasury and the Reserve Bank during 2020 to implement loan deferrals and liquidity measures. Z’s profile as a quasi-policy partner (while also ensuring it was seen as a team player in crisis, mitigating potential political anger at banks).
• Ownership Structure: BNZ’s ultimate foreign ownership has occasionally spurred political debate about banking sovereignty. Proposals for a state-owned competitor (Kiwibank) to curb the Aussies’ influence often cite BNZ as an example of profits flowing offshore. BNZ itself has argued that its Australian link brings strength and that it operates with local governance. Nonetheless, trans-Tasman capital flows and influence are inherent in BNZ’s situation.
• Regulatory Changes: BNZ will be impacted by upcoming regulatory reforms – e.g. the new Depositor Compensation Scheme (government guarantee of deposits up to $100k) coming into force in 2024, and the Conduct of Financial Institutions (CoFI) regime which imposes stricter conduct obligations. BNZ has been preparing for these and quietly lobbying on the implementing details (to ensure rules aren’t overly onerous). How BNZ adapts is of interest given its past issues.
• Integration with NAB: BNZ benefits from and sometimes is constrained by NAB’s strategies. For instance, NAB’s global policies (on things like climate risk, political engagement, etc.) apply to BNZ. Recently NAB announced it would cease lending to certain carbon-intensive projects – a policy that extends to BNZ and could influence BNZ’s omestic debates on climate finance. On the other hand, NAB can infuse capital into BNZ or pull back dividends to meet regulatory demands, which can become a political point (e.g. in the capital requirements debate).
• Technology & Data: BNZ has been slower than some to adopt open banking standards – a point noted by the Commerce Commission (lack of open data sharing hinders competition). BNZ is now involved in the development of New Zealandwork, likely aiming to balance consumer choice with protecting its customer data advantages. Technology investments (like BNZ’s new mobile app, and a multi-year core banking system upgrade in progress) are not just operational but also part of its narrative to regulators that it’s innovating for customers (hence heavy lobbying to avoid extra regulatory costs that “might limit” such investment).
In summary, BNZ’s size, foreign ownership, and history make it a linchpin of New Zealand’s financial system – and a frequent focus in discussions about market power and integrity.
29. Recipient of Wage Subsidy Scheme: No. BNZ did not receive the COVID-19 Wage Subsidy. As an essential service that continued operating (and remained profitable) during the 2020–21 pandemic disruptions, BNZ did not meet the revenue-decline criteria for government wage support. The Ministry of Social Development’s public database of wage subsidy recipients shows no entry for Bank of New Zealand. In fact, BNZ’s CEO at the time stated the bank’s priority was supporting other businesses via loan relief, rather than needing subsidies itself. (Notably, BNZ’s parent NAB also declined to seek wage subsidies in New Zealand or Australia.) While some large NZ companies faced criticism for taking subsidies, BNZ avoided this by foregoing the scheme. This spared it the controversy that might have arisen had a profitable bank taken taxpayer funds. However, indirectly BNZ benefited from broader government economic support and did implemcost cuts during the pandemic as precautionary measures.
Sources
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Spot anything in this entry that is wrong? Please either leave a comment at the end or email, in confidence: bryce@democracyproject.nz