Uber NZ

1. Name of Organisation: Uber New Zealand (encompassing Uber’s ridesharing and “Uber Eats” food delivery services). Locally, operations are conducted via subsidiaries of Uber Technologies, Inc..

2. New Zealand Business Numbers (NZBN):

   • Uber New Zealand Technologies Limited – NZBN 9429030215177 (Co. No. 4451818), registered 27 June 2013.

   • Rasier New Zealand Limited – NZBN 9429047053663 (Co. No. 7056276), registered 5 October 2018.

   • Portier New Zealand Limited – NZBN 9429047053724 (Co. No. 7056395), registered 5 October 2018.

3. Company Status: All are registered New Zealand limited companies (private). Uber New Zealand Limited (an earlier entity) was removed from the register in 2015.

4. Ownership and Control: Wholly owned foreign subsidiaries. Uber New Zealand Technologies Ltd is 100% owned by Uber International Holding B.V. (Amsterdam), an intermediate holding company of Uber Technologies, Inc.. This reflects Uber’s global structure routing international ownership via the Netherlands. A 2021 report identified over 50 interconnected Uber shell companies in the Netherlands and other tax havens.

5. Ultimate Parent Company: Uber Technologies, Inc. – a publicly listed corporation (NYSE: UBER) headquartered in San Francisco, USA. It operates globally via complex subsidiaries; Uber’s main international holding entity is based in the Netherlands, and NZ entities ultimately roll up to the U.S. parent.

6. Head Office (Global): 1515 3rd Street, San Francisco, CA, USA (Uber’s global headquarters). Head Office (NZ): No public corporate headquarters in NZ (the official registered office is a law/accounting address in Christchurch). Currently: Level 1, 100 Moorhouse Avenue, Addington, Christchurch. Previously, Uber’s NZ offices were in Auckland (Viaduct Harbour and Kingsland addresses), but since late 2019 the official address shifted to Christchurch (likely for administrative purposes).

7. Branding and Trading Names: “Uber” – ride-hailing platform connecting passengers with drivers via a mobile app. “Uber Eats” – on-demand food delivery platform connecting customers, couriers, and restaurants. Both brands are operated in NZ by Uber’s subsidiaries and are part of the global Uber portfolio.

8. Local Operations and Services: Launched first in Auckland on 4 May 2014. Uber’s ridesharing service now operates in at least seven NZ cities (Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, Hamilton, Tauranga, Dunedin, Queenstown). Uber Eats food delivery launched in Auckland in March 2017 and expanded nationwide, partnering with 1,000+ restaurants within its first year. Uber also introduced ancillary services like e-scooter rentals (e.g. “Jump” scooters) in NZ, showing its growing mobility footprint.

9. NZ Subsidiary Roles: Uber uses multiple entities for specific business lines:

   • Uber New Zealand Technologies Ltd: Provides support, marketing, and local research services for Uber’s platforms. (This entity records only service fees from related companies, rather than direct ride or delivery revenue).

   • Rasier New Zealand Ltd: Operates the Uber ridesharing business (contracts with drivers and riders). “Rasier” is the Uber group entity handling ride-hail operations in many countries.

   • Portier New Zealand Ltd: Operates the Uber Eats food delivery business (contracts with couriers and restaurants). “Portier” is the Uber entity managing delivery services.

   • Uber B.V. (Netherlands): Not an NZ company but relevant – Uber’s Dutch arm that contracts with drivers and processes fares offshore for the ridesharing service.

   • Uber Portier B.V. (Netherlands): Contracts relating to Uber Eats internationally.

(These layered entities mean an NZ user’s payment for an Uber ride or meal goes first to a Dutch company, which then remits a portion back to the NZ arm and the driver/courier.)

10. Directors (NZ Entities):

    • Nicholas Falzon – Director of Uber New Zealand Technologies Ltd since Oct 2015. An Australian-based accountant (PKF Sydney partner) who serves as a director for Uber subsidiaries in Australasia. He has been a key Uber nominee on NZ boards.

    • Brian Lee Kuntz – Appointed 2022 as a director of Rasier NZ and Portier NZ. Based overseas (an Uber executive), indicating continued offshore control.

    • Former directors have included Rob van der Woude (served 2016–2018) and Karen Sammis Walker (2014–2016), both US or Australia-based Uber personnel, and Yoke Fah Chong (2021–2024), likely an Asia-Pacific Uber executive. All directors of Uber’s NZ companies are or have been foreign executives; there are no known independent or New Zealand-based directors.

11. Key Executive Personnel (New Zealand): Uber’s day-to-day NZ operations have been overseen by managers appointed by the parent:

    • Richard Menzies – First NZ General Manager (launched the service in Auckland 2014). He publicly represented Uber during early regulatory battles. Relocated to Australia in 2018 to work on Uber Eats.

    • Amanda Gilmore – New Zealand Country Manager for ridesharing (2018–2020). Under her leadership Uber expanded to seven NZ cities, reaching ~485,000 riders and 6,500 drivers by 2019. She later moved into a regional role.

    • Emma Foley – Launched Uber Eats NZ (2017) and was NZ Uber Eats lead until 2018.

    • Since 2020, NZ operations have been managed under Uber’s Australia & NZ regional team. Mitch Cooper was named Head of Public Policy & Government Affairs ANZ in 2020, reflecting that executive and lobbying functions are largely coordinated from Sydney. There is currently no publicly listed New Zealand-based country GM, indicating centralized regional control.

12. Employees and Contractors: Uber’s operating model relies on independent contractors rather than employees for its core services.

    • Direct Employees (NZ): Minimal. Aside from a small team in marketing, sales, and support, Uber’s NZ staff headcount is not disclosed (likely a few dozen at most). The NZ companies had zero direct employees for driver operations, as drivers are not employees.

    • Drivers and Couriers: ~6,500 active driver-partners in NZ (as of 2019); current figures (2025) likely higher. Thousands of delivery couriers are contracted for Uber Eats (exact number not publicly reported – Data Not Found). All are classified as self-employed contractors, a status that has been legally disputed.

13. Scope of NZ Business: Uber has become a major player in New Zealand’s transport and food sectors:

    • Ridesharing: Available in all major urban centres; by 2019, NZ riders had taken millions of trips totaling 230 million kilometres. Competes with traditional taxis and a few smaller app rivals (Ola, Zoomy).

    • Food Delivery: Uber Eats dominates NZ’s app-based delivery market alongside a few competitors (e.g. Menulog, DeliverEasy). Partnered restaurants nationwide, including major chains and small businesses.

    • Uber NZ has occasionally partnered with local bodies (e.g. a Wellington regional scheme subsidising Uber rides for disabled passengers during transport disruptions), indicating its integration into NZ’s transport ecosystem.

14. Revenues (NZ): Uber’s local financial filings show only a fraction of the total ride/payment volumes:

    • Uber New Zealand Technologies Ltd reported service fee income of NZ$3.75 million for year ended 2020. (This fee is essentially what Uber NZ earned for providing support services – it does not reflect the gross fares paid by NZ riders, which are mostly booked offshore).

    • Rasier NZ and Portier NZ’s financials are not published separately (as they likely funnel most revenue directly overseas). Estimates based on market share suggest Uber’s total gross bookings in NZ were well over NZ$100 million annually by 2020, most of which is processed by offshore affiliates.

15. Profits and Taxation (NZ): The local entities report only small profits, if any:

    • In 2020 Uber New Zealand Technologies Ltd’s net profit before tax was approximately NZ$150,000. Owing to carried-forward losses and adjustments, it paid zero corporate income tax that year.

    • Uber NZ has paid little income tax historically – analyses indicate it avoided an estimated NZ$6.4–12.8 million in NZ corporate tax for 2020 by shifting income abroad. Its accounts show unusually low taxable profits given Uber’s large NZ user base, achieved via intragroup charges (royalties, service fees to its Netherlands companies).

    • The company often records tax credits. In 2019, despite generating service fees locally, Uber NZ Tech had a net tax credit, actually increasing post-tax profit while overall revenue fell. This suggests aggressive use of expenses and transfer pricing to minimise taxable income in New Zealand.

16. Corporate Structure and Tax Arrangements: Uber’s use of Dutch subsidiaries is deliberate tax structuring:

    • NZ Uber entities are directly owned by Uber’s Netherlands-based companies rather than by the US parent. This means no consolidated public reporting in NZ – each NZ company files minimal accounts, making it hard to gauge total NZ turnover.

    • Payments for NZ rides go to Uber B.V. (NL), which keeps the majority and sends back only a “service fee” portion to Uber NZ. Similarly, Uber Eats transactions involve Uber Portier B.V. (NL). This mechanism shifts revenue offshore before profit is calculated, a form of base erosion. An Uber whistle-blower report described the NZ accounts as “phony” records of related-party transactions that don’t reflect actual business done in NZ.

    • The Netherlands is the hub of Uber’s international tax planning. Globally, Uber even secured a secret €6.1 billion tax deduction via moving intellectual property to the Netherlands. New Zealand’s share of Uber’s profits is effectively siphoned through this Dutch conduit, leaving the NZ entities largely as cost centres.

17. Regulatory Status in NZ: Uber’s rideshare and delivery services now operate legally under NZ law, but this followed a period of operating outside traditional regulations:

    • Until 2017, Uber operated in a grey zone – it launched without its drivers having the proper passenger-service licenses (P endorsement) or certificates of fitness for vehicles, in contravention of transport law. Uber NZ openly defied these licensing rules, arguing they were overly burdensome.

    • The New Zealand Government responded by overhauling small passenger service regulations. The Land Transport Amendment Act 2017 deregulated the taxi industry and formally recognized ridesharing. It removed “unnecessary compliance” requirements to make Uber’s model legal. For example, mandatory in-vehicle security cameras were dropped for app-based services like Uber. Since October 2017, Uber and its drivers are required to meet simplified standards (drivers must hold a P endorsement and undergo background checks, but many taxi-specific rules were eliminated).

    • Current compliance: Uber NZ (Rasier NZ) is registered as a transport service operator with NZTA. Drivers must be individually licensed. Uber Eats operates under general commercial regulations. Uber is not subject to any NZ-specific tech platform regulation beyond standard consumer and competition laws (as of 2025).

18. Key Regulatory or Legal Challenges:

    • Employment Status of Drivers/Couriers: Uber's legal battle over the employment status of its drivers in New Zealand has progressed significantly. In 2022, the Employment Court ruled that four Uber drivers were employees, not independent contractors, granting them full employment rights. Uber appealed this decision, but in August 2024, the Court of Appeal upheld the original ruling, emphasizing Uber's substantial control over drivers' work conditions and dismissing the company's arguments as "window dressing" .Uber has since sought a further appeal, and the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear the case on July 8 and 9, 2025. This upcoming hearing will be pivotal in determining whether Uber drivers in New Zealand are classified as employees or contractors .

    • Regulatory Compliance History: Uber has a history of flouting rules to pressure for change. In 2016 it instructed drivers to operate without proper licenses, prompting warnings and fines from authorities. It has received NZTA compliance notices and was subject to protest by taxi operators for alleged illegal operations. The early confrontations eased after law changes in 2017, but now labour law has become the flashpoint (as above).

    • Data Privacy & Security: Uber reported a global data breach in 2016 which affected NZ users (e.g. personal data of NZ riders/drivers was compromised). No NZ-specific sanctions ensued beyond global remedies.

    • Consumer Complaints: The Commerce Commission has fielded complaints about Uber’s conduct (e.g. in 2015–2017, ~37 complaints about Uber and a local competitor were logged). Issues ranged from false advertising to fare disputes, but no major enforcement action in NZ has been publicized.

19. Lobbying and Public Relations: (See Part Two for detailed analysis.) Uber NZ does not appear on any public lobbying register (NZ has no mandatory register). However, Uber has engaged in significant lobbying and influence efforts through both in-house staff and third parties:

    • In-house Government Affairs: Uber created a Head of Public Policy & Government Affairs role for NZ/Australia in 2016, explicitly to engage policymakers and push for regulatory change. Company statements confirm Uber “wanted to work with the government on new rules” as early as 2016. Uber’s internal lobbyists have actively met with ministers and officials (e.g. meeting with Workplace Minister in 2024)

    • External Lobbyists/Consultants: Data Not Found on any specific lobbying firm on retainer. Uber has kept much of its lobbying in-house or via industry groups. There is evidence Uber coordinated with BusinessNZ, a prominent business lobby, to promote its preferred contractor legislation in 2023. No public records show law firms or PR agencies directly lobbying government on Uber’s behalf, but it is known from overseas leaks that Uber employed elite lobbying consultancies globally.

    • Public Relations: Uber’s PR in NZ has been managed by its local team with oversight from its global communications department. It frequently employs media campaigns (op-eds, blog posts, rider alerts) to sway public opinion – for instance, rallying users and drivers to support its position during regulatory changes (e.g. in 2017, Uber warned it might withhold UberPOOL carpooling if unfavourable rules passed). Uber NZ’s communications often stress positive economic contributions (claiming $1.5 billion impact in 2024) and consumer benefits, while downplaying regulatory disputes.

20. Political Engagements and Donations: There are no recorded political donations in NZ by Uber or its staff (above the public disclosure thresholds) – Data Not Found. Instead of overt donations, Uber’s influence has come via direct lobbying and informal relationships. Uber representatives have made submissions to parliamentary committees and government consultations (e.g. on transport regulation reform in 2016–17). They have also leveraged diplomatic channels (Uber’s global execs lobbied NZ officials at international events – e.g. then-CEO Travis Kalanick courted leaders at forums like APEC, though specific NZ interactions are not documented – Data Not Found). Overall, Uber’s political influence strategy in NZ relies on persuasion and policy arguments rather than campaign contributions.

21. Revolving Door & Political Connections: There is currently no known case of any NZ politician or minister joining Uber’s payroll or vice versa – Data Not Found. Uber NZ’s lobbyists have primarily been professional policy staff (not ex-MPs). However, the company has shown an ability to gain high-level access:

    • Globally, leaked communications (the “Uber Files”) revealed that Uber cultivated friendly ties with politicians (e.g. secret support from France’s Emmanuel Macron as Economy Minister). In NZ, an example of close access is Uber securing meetings with a Cabinet Minister to discuss law changes beneficial to the company. This indicates strong political networks, even if not through formal hiring of ex-officials.

    • One indirect connection: The ACT Party (now in government coalition) has ideologically aligned with Uber’s deregulatory agenda. ACT’s Minister Brooke van Velden (Workplace Relations) championed legal changes that closely mirrored Uber’s own proposals (leading critics to accuse the government of “copying Uber’s homework”). While not a personal revolving door case, this alignment suggests Uber’s ideas found resonance within a political party’s platform.

22. Memberships and Affiliations: Uber is a member of various industry and business associations:

    • Likely a member of BusinessNZ or its affiliates (as evidenced by collaborative lobbying on contractor policy).

    • Globally, Uber is part of ride-share industry coalitions; in NZ it joined taxi companies in industry submissions after legalization (for example, working with the Taxi Federation on some driver safety initiatives post-2017 – Data Not Found in public sources).

    • No known affiliation with trade unions or worker associations (in fact, Uber is in adversarial stance against unions in the employment court cases).

23. Consultancies and Contractors: Uber NZ has engaged major accounting and legal firms for specific needs:

    • Tax Advisers: Likely uses one of the Big 4 accounting firms for tax and transfer pricing advice (e.g. Deloitte or PwC – though specific info is confidential; Data Not Found).

    • Legal Counsel: In its court battles, Uber has retained top-tier law firms. (For instance, in the employment status case, Uber was represented by leading counsel and appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. It can be inferred firms like Russell McVeagh or Bell Gully have advised Uber, given their involvement in related commentary – exact engagements not publicly disclosed).

    • PR Agencies: No public records of Uber hiring external PR agencies in NZ. Its crises have been handled internally. (Contrast with some countries where Uber hired lobbying firms, in NZ their strategy appears more in-house and via business lobby groups.)

24. Transparency and Disclosures: Uber NZ provides minimal voluntary transparency:

    • It does not publish country-specific transparency reports on lobbying or government interactions (unlike, say, its voluntary safety reports in the US – not produced in NZ).

    • Information on its NZ financials only comes through statutory filings and the work of journalists/academics. Uber has not publicly broken out its NZ revenues or tax contributions except when pressed by media.

    • There is no NZ-specific corporate social responsibility report. Uber globally issues statements, but localised NZ disclosures (e.g. on driver earnings, impacts) are sparse. This lack of proactive disclosure means much of what is known about Uber’s NZ influence is uncovered through investigations, not provided by the company.

25. Corporate Ethics and Compliance: Officially, Uber claims to follow all applicable laws in NZ and adhere to its global code of conduct. In practice, its record is checkered:

    • Legal Compliance: Uber NZ deliberately broke or circumvented regulations (transport licensing) until laws were changed in its favour. It only complied once new rules were in place. Currently, it faces judicial rulings that it has been misclassifying employees, indicating non-compliance with labour standards.

    • Ethical Conduct: The company’s aggressive tactics (e.g. encouraging drivers to operate illegally in 2016, or threatening to withhold services to influence policy) have raised ethical flags. Uber’s internal communications (revealed in leaks) have shown a win-at-all-costs ethos – e.g. executives privately acknowledging “violence guarantees success” in some lobbying contexts. While that quote pertained to Europe, it reflects a culture that likely influenced NZ operations during the same period.

    • Corporate Responsibility: Uber NZ has made some positive PR efforts (promoting safe rides, offering free rides on election days or to vaccination sites, partnering with Red Cross for charity drives). However, critics view these as token efforts overshadowed by its core practices of avoiding worker rights and taxes.

26. Notable Lobbying Issues (Last Decade): Over the past 10 years, Uber’s political influence in New Zealand has centered on:

    • Rideshare Legalisation (2014–2017): Uber lobbied intensely to rewrite transport rules. It pressured ministers by leveraging public popularity of its service. In 2017, Parliament passed a law largely accommodating Uber’s model. Taxi industry observers said the “rules were written for Uber”, highlighting Uber’s lobbying victory.

    • Labour Classification (2018–present): As the gig economy debate grew, Uber campaigned to preserve drivers’ contractor status. It opposed the previous Labour government’s proposed contractor protections (through submissions behind closed doors – Data Not Found publicly) and then actively influenced the incoming 2023 government to swing policy in its favour. This culminated in draft legislation in 2024 echoing Uber’s own recommendations on defining contractors.

    • Tax and Fiscal Policy (2019–2022): When NZ moved to enforce GST on rideshare fares (eliminating Uber’s prior GST advantage), Uber engaged with officials but ultimately had to comply. (The 2022 Taxation (Platform Economy) bill now makes Uber collect GST on fares, leveling the field with taxis. Uber publicly stated support to “simplify tax collection”, likely to save face; its true stance on the policy behind scenes is unknown – Data Not Found).

    • Local Government & Transport Policy: Uber periodically lobbies city councils on matters like airport pickup fees, congestion charges, and public transport integration. For example, it negotiated with Wellington Airport for dedicated ride-share pickup zones, undercutting taxi exclusivity. It also promotes itself as part of the public transport mix (Uber’s NZ manager talked of “working with Government, complementing public transport”). These efforts aim to entrench Uber in future transport planning (e.g. being included in multi-modal journey apps, contracts for first/last mile transit solutions).

    • Covid-19 Response: During pandemic lockdowns, Uber lobbied to be classified as an essential service for food delivery. It succeeded in continuing Uber Eats under Level 3 restrictions (restaurants could do delivery via Uber). It also pushed back against any cap on delivery commissions (NZ did not impose a cap, unlike some jurisdictions – aligning with Uber’s lobbying against such regulation globally – Data Not Found specific NZ).

27. Third-Party Allies and Proxies: Uber has leveraged third-party voices to amplify its influence:

    • Drivers and Customers (“Grassroots”): Uber has a history of mobilising its app users to support its causes. In NZ, Uber encouraged drivers to speak to media about the income opportunities and riders to submit feedback during the 2016 transport rule review (Uber’s submission included user testimonials – Data Not Found exact quotes). This strategy creates an appearance of public support for Uber’s position.

    • Industry Groups: As noted, BusinessNZ and possibly the NZ Chambers of Commerce have echoed Uber’s arguments about flexibility and innovation. Uber is also informally aligned with the wider tech sector’s lobby (which often opposes over-regulation of digital platforms).

    • International Bodies: The US Embassy in NZ and American Chamber of Commerce have at times advocated for fair treatment of American companies – this broad pro-business diplomacy indirectly benefits Uber. (No specific cable on Uber is public, but US officials routinely champion digital economy firms in trade talks – Data Not Found in NZ context).

28. Conflicts of Interest: Potential conflicts involving Uber in NZ include:

    • Policy Drafting Influence: Revelations in late 2024 that Uber’s own proposal was essentially copy-pasted into government policy on contractors raised serious conflict concerns. The government’s consultation process appeared to give Uber outsized input – essentially allowing a private company to write rules that govern it. Opposition parties and unions labelled this “deep in the pockets of Uber” policymaking.

    • Ministerial Meetings: The Workplace Minister meeting Uber while simultaneously considering law changes benefiting Uber (and potentially prejudicing an active court case) gave an impression of conflict. Minister Brooke van Velden insisted it wasn’t due to the ongoing case, but the timing and Uber’s proactive outreach suggest Uber had privileged access. Other ministers (e.g. Transport Ministers in 2015–17) met with Uber representatives in the course of regulatory reform – those meetings were not public, raising transparency issues (we only learned through OIA that Uber requested separate treatment in the law and issued ultimatums).

    • Advisory Boards: Uber NZ formed a “Local Advisory Forum” in recent years, bringing selected drivers and community members together periodically. While framed as community engagement, these forums could also be seen as a way to claim stakeholder consultation and potentially co-opt critical voices. There’s no evidence of politicians on these advisory groups, so direct conflict is limited – but it’s a tactic that can water down outside criticism by bringing critics “inside the tent”.

29. Overall Public Profile in NZ: Uber presents itself as a dynamic tech innovator providing consumer choice and flexible earning opportunities. It often highlights feel-good stories (reducing drunk driving by offering safe rides, helping local eateries reach customers via Uber Eats). However, its public image has also been marred by:

    • Driver protests and negative media about low pay and lack of rights.

    • Taxi industry complaints of unfair competition and “two-tier” regulatory treatment.

    • News reports on its tax avoidance and minimal contributions to the NZ economy relative to its usage.

    • Revelations of its hardball lobbying tactics globally, which cast doubt on its claims of being a reformed company.

In summary, Uber in New Zealand is a high-profile multinational actor whose rapid rise was facilitated by regulatory concessions and whose continued success is bolstered by sophisticated (if opaque) influence efforts. It remains a subject of controversy and scrutiny in political and public spheres.

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Sources:

[1] Terry Baucher, Uber must be reined in – and we all have a part to play, The Spinoff (25 Jul 2022). https://thespinoff.co.nz/business/25-07-2022/uber-must-be-reined-in-and-we-all-have-a-part-to-play

[2] BizDb Company Profile, Uber New Zealand Technologies Limited, BizDb.co.nz (accessed Mar 2025). https://www.bizdb.co.nz/company/9429030215177/

[3] Shieff Angland, Court of Appeal’s review of Uber drivers’ employment status, ShieffAngland.co.nz (2023). https://shieffangland.co.nz/blog/news/court-of-appeal-s-review-of-uber-drivers-employment-status/

[4] RNZ News, Report claims Uber avoided millions in company tax, Radio New Zealand (18 Nov 2021). https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/business/455965/report-claims-uber-avoided-millions-in-company-tax

[5] RNZ News, Taxi changes: “People will just have to be more careful”, Radio New Zealand (17 Mar 2017). https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/326812/taxi-changes-people-will-just-have-to-be-more-careful

[6] RNZ News, Minister Brooke van Velden confirms meeting with Uber over contractor law change, Radio New Zealand (27 Jun 2024). https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/520719/minister-brooke-van-velden-confirms-meeting-with-uber-over-contractor-law-change

[7] RNZ News, “Deep in the pockets of Uber” – Government accused of copy-pasting company’s position, Radio New Zealand (17 Oct 2024). https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/531025/deep-in-the-pockets-of-uber-government-accused-of-copy-pasting-company-s-position

[8] Medianama, What Ola is up against in New Zealand (26 Sep 2018). https://www.medianama.com/2018/09/223-ola-newzealand-launch-our-take-2/

[9] NZ Herald, Five years of Uber: New Zealanders have collectively clocked up 230 million km since launch (24 May 2019). https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/companies/freight-logistics/five-years-of-uber-new-zealanders-have-collectively-clocked-up-230-million-km-since-launch/XTEKKEVQODGQMAXRQW3X5GFWVY/

[10] Uber Newsroom, Introducing two new leaders in New Zealand (20 Jul 2018). https://www.uber.com/en-NZ/newsroom/newnzgms/

[11] RNZ News, Uber will continue to defy licensing rules, Radio New Zealand (6 Jul 2016). https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/308034/uber-will-continue-to-defy-licensing-rules

[12] RNZ News, Anger over Uber’s advice for drivers to break law, Radio New Zealand (7 Jul 2016). https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/308105/anger-over-uber-s-advice-for-drivers-to-break-law

[13] BusinessDesk, Uber seeks government affairs manager to lobby for regulatory change in NZ, BusinessDesk (Jonathan Underhill – 12 Sep 2016). (Subscription)

[14] Guardian, Uber broke laws, duped police and secretly lobbied governments, leak reveals, The Guardian (10 Jul 2022). https://www.theguardian.com/news/2022/jul/10/uber-files-leak-reveals-global-lobbying-campaign

[15] Guardian, Emmanuel Macron secretly aided Uber lobbying in France, texts reveal, The Guardian (10 Jul 2022). https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/jul/10/emmanuel-macron-secretly-aided-uber-lobbying-in-france-texts-reveal

[16] NZ Parliament Hansard, Land Transport Amendment Bill — In Committee, speech by Denis O’Rourke (2017) – New Zealand Parliament. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/document/51HansS_20170216_052800000/o-rourke-denis-land-transport-amendment-bill-no-2-in

[17] RNZ News, Unions accuse Uber NZ of avoiding $13m in tax, The New Zealand Herald (via NZ Herald, 18 Nov 2021). https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/unions-accuse-uber-nz-of-avoiding-13m-in-tax/R7L2T7J6K4R7FH2P4X3VZPTZYY/

[18] The Spinoff, Uber has a new women’s safety campaign, but is it enough? (26 Nov 2019). https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/26-11-2019/uber-has-a-new-womens-safety-campaign-but-is-it-enough

[19] Uber Blog, Uber’s impact in 2024: contributing $1.5 billion to New Zealand’s economy (Uber-commissioned report summary, Apr 2024). https://www.uber.com/en-NZ/blog/ubers-impact-in-2024-contributing-1-5-billion-to-new-zealands-economy

[20] NZ Court of Appeal, Arachchige v Rasier New Zealand Ltd & Ors [2023] NZCA 475 (judgment summary – Uber drivers are employees). (Legal case)

[21] NZ Employment Court, E Tū & First Union v Rasier NZ Ltd & Ors [2022] NZEmpC 192 (judgment – drivers declared employees). (Legal case)

[22] Dentons, Uber loses appeal – four Uber drivers are employees, not contractors (Dentons law firm article, 27 Aug 2024). https://www.dentons.co.nz/en/insights/articles/2024/august/27/uber-loses-appeal-four-uber-drivers-are-employees-not-contractors

[23] RNZ News, Documents show Uber’s proposed law changes mirrored in government policy, Radio New Zealand (Lillian Hanly, 17 Oct 2024). (Related to [7])

[24] NZ CTU, Minister must listen to Court’s Uber ruling and abandon contractor law changes, NZ Council of Trade Unions (Press release, 29 Aug 2024). https://union.org.nz/minister-must-listen-to-courts-uber-ruling-and-abandon-contractor-law-changes/

[25] Idealog, Of apps and ice cream: Uber’s disruption of the traditional transport industry (Interview with Uber NZ GM, 2014). https://idealog.co.nz/venture/2014/11/apps-and-ice-cream-ubers-disruption-traditional-transport-industry

[Note: Some sources marked as (Subscription) or (Legal case) may not be directly accessible to readers but are included for completeness of citation.]

Spot anything in this entry that is wrong? Please either leave a comment at the end or email, in confidence: bryce@democracyproject.nz