Integrity Briefing: Do political donations influence which businesses get fast-tracked?

If a business donates $50,000 to politicians who then give that business special exemptions not available to others, isn’t that a serious conflict of interest?

I’m talking about the Fast Track Act applicants and the money they’ve donated to National, NZ First and Act. This is an important issue because the donation disclosures for 2024 have just been released, and these show that, as with last year, there are many businesses donating to the politicians in office who also have applied for Fast Track approval for their business developments.

On the face of it, there appears to be good reason for suspecting a quid pro quo situation in which the Cabinet Ministers deciding upon which businesses get the approval might be swayed by money or promises of money. However, no rules are being broken officially, simply because there are no rules at the Cabinet level about these donations and Fast Track Act decisions. This is despite the fact that the new Fast Track Act concentrates discretionary power in ministerial hands without the usual checks and balances of public participation and judicial review.

The politicians have written these lax Cabinet Manual rules on the basis that, technically, these large donations aren’t going to the ministers but to their political parties instead. Ministers can say, “No, there is no conflict of interest since I have no personal financial stake in these donations.” But is that good enough? Or do we need to reform the rules for politicians receiving donations?

Donations from Fast Track businesses to government politicians

RNZ’s investigative journalist Farah Hancock has delved into the latest donation disclosures to identify the business interests that both donate to the parties in power and want Fast Track approval. Today's report states, “NZ First received $121,680 and National received $58,897.25 from donors linked to fast-tracked projects during 2024”.

She outlines the Fast Track businesses donated:

• Sanford (fisheries) gave $12,000 to NZ First

• McCallum Bros (sand mining) gave $12,000 to NZ First

• Ngāti Manuhiri Settlement Trust (sand mining, property and aquaculture) gave $12,000 to NZ First

• Gibbston Village (property) gave $6710 to the National Party

• Russell Property Group (property) gave National $12,187, and Brett Russell also donated $35,000 to National

• Melrose Private Capital (sand mining) gave $84,680 to NZ First

You can read her report here: Ministers continue to make decisions on fast-track projects after parties take donations linked to applicants

These recent donations are on top of many from previous years. Back in October, Hancock’s investigation found that “Companies and shareholders associated with 12 fast-track projects gave more than $500,000 in political donations to National, Act and New Zealand First and their candidates” – see: $500,000 in political donations associated with fast track projects

For example, a total of $206,154 was donated to the parties of government by property developer Christopher Meehan and his associated businesses, such as Winton Property (which had its giant Sunfield housing development added to the fast-track list for approval). Other Fast Track donors identified last year were: Fletcher Concrete and Infrastructure, Coronet Village, Kings Quarry, Katikati Quarry, Green Steel, and Carter Group.

When is a donation a conflict of interest? The Cabinet Manual vs. Reality

Under New Zealand’s current rules, political donations occupy a murky grey zone in terms of conflicts of interest. The Cabinet Manual, which sets ethical guidelines for ministers, is very clear that ministers must avoid and declare any conflicts between their personal interests and their public duties. For example, if a minister or their family stands to benefit financially from a decision, they should step aside from that decision.

However, nowhere does the Cabinet Manual explicitly list “receiving a donation” as a conflict of interest for a minister. University of Otago law professor Andrew Geddis points out that simply having a donor who would be affected by a policy is not considered a conflict by our rules. He explained the rationale for this to Farah Hancock last year, saying that in a system where campaigns are funded by private donations, if we treated donations as conflicts, then “parties couldn’t make decisions on anything that impacts their donors”, which is practically unworkable.

Geddis argued: “The unions give lots of money to the Labour Party. If that meant Labour couldn’t pass workplace relations legislation that impacts unions, it would take a huge policy issue out of play.” In other words, by pragmatic necessity, the mere fact a minister’s party received money from someone is not automatically disqualifying. If it were, donors could effectively paralyse the government from acting on whole swathes of policy.

Is this approach adequate? Many argue it is not, precisely because it ignores the broader party-level conflict that big donations create. The Cabinet Manual and conflict rules were not designed with political contributions in mind. They assume a world where conflicts are personal (financial holdings, family interests, etc.), not political (campaign funding). Modern campaigning, however, means private money is deeply embedded in public decision-making – a reality our integrity framework has yet to confront fully.

Furthermore, the Fast Track allocation of special exemptions for specific businesses has taken ministerial decision-making into a new area. Geddis’ logic collapses when applied to specific, high-stakes, discretionary decisions such as individual project approvals under the Fast Track Act. In these instances, the benefit to the donor is not a diffuse, general policy outcome shared by many, but a direct, often substantial, and individualised gain. The sheer scale of some modern donations, combined with the concentrated power vested in Ministers by the Fast Track Act, fundamentally alters the ethical calculus.

Calling time on the status quo: Toward stronger safeguards

In Farah Hancock’s RNZ report today I’m reported as calling for reform in this area: “Political scientist Bryce Edwards said in his view donations could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest, and called for clearer rules to maintain public trust in government… He suggested ministers disclose connections between applicants and donors to enhance transparency and public confidence.”

What would this look like? Hopefully, the Office of the Auditor General will have some good ideas for this. Back in October, the Auditor General launched an inquiry into how conflicts of interest were managed under the Fast Track Act, and this inquiry will surely involve the question of political donations.

Given that the evidence is mounting that the status quo is inadequate to safeguard integrity, here are several changes and reforms worth considering:

1) Treat major donor conflicts like personal conflicts

The Cabinet Manual could be updated to explicitly require ministers to consider party donations as a potential source of bias. If a decision will directly benefit a significant donor (say above a certain threshold) to a minister’s party or campaign, that should trigger a conflict of interest process – perhaps an expectation that the minister offer to step aside or at least transparently acknowledge the link.

This wouldn’t mean, as Geddis feared, that governments can never legislate on areas their donors care about. But for narrow, specific decisions (like granting a particular project fast-track status or awarding a contract), it’s reasonable to say, “Minister X’s party received a large donation from Y, who is involved in this decision; therefore Minister X will not participate to avoid any perception of bias.”

Such a step would show the public that ministers are going above and beyond to assure impartiality. It’s a delicate reform (and politicians will resist tying their own hands). Still, it could be as simple as expanding the definition of conflicts in the Cabinet Manual to include situations of dependency on a donor.

2) Real-time donation disclosure and meeting logs

One issue that has been highlighted is the lag in knowing who donated and potential hidden interactions. The donations currently being discussed were only made public in May 2025, months after the fast-track list was decided. Moving toward real-time or quarterly donation disclosures (instead of annual) would narrow the window where undeclared donations could influence decisions.

Additionally, ministers’ official diaries should be comprehensive and proactively released, especially for any meetings with stakeholders or donors regarding major projects. The Shane Jones diary fiasco – when he left a Fast Track meeting with a mining company out of his official diary – should not happen again.

We should also implement a lobbyist registry and contact reporting system so that any communications between major donors (or their companies) and ministers are logged and can be scrutinised. Sunlight is a great disinfectant: if ministers know any meeting or call with a donor about their pet project will be public, they’ll be exceedingly careful to keep everything above board (or avoid it entirely, which may be for the best). More transparency would also empower the public and media to spot potential conflicts in advance rather than uncovering them after the fact.

3) Require full public disclosure of conflicts and management

In line with calls in other recent Integrity Briefings about conflicts of interest amongst government ministers, the secrecy surrounding the declaration and management of ministerial conflicts of interest must end. The Cabinet Manual should require the public disclosure of declared conflicts and, crucially, the specific mechanisms implemented to manage them.

4) Independent integrity bodies

New Zealand is unusual among comparable democracies in not having a dedicated anti-corruption commission at the national level. We rely on officers like the Auditor-General, Ombudsman, and Police/SFO to handle issues piecemeal. The current scenario suggests a need for a more focused watchdog.

One idea is an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) similar to those in Australian states, which can investigate political finance improprieties and conflicts. Such an independent agency could regularly audit decisions like fast-track approvals to ensure no covert influence, and it could probe suspicious coincidences between donations and outcomes.

Even short of a new commission, the Auditor-General’s remit could be expanded to conduct routine audits of high-risk decision-making processes (like procurement, fast-track consents, etc.) for correlation with donations. The key is to have someone outside the political tent watching for patterns – because self-policing only goes so far when every party has an interest in the money flow continuing.

5) Reform political funding

Ultimately, to reduce the conflict at its root, New Zealand might need to reassess how political parties finance themselves. Depending on private money from businesses or wealthy individuals will always raise questions of quid pro quo.

There are already plenty of ideas for reform that have been publicised. But a novel one that should be discussed in New Zealand is “sector-specific bans”. Following Australia’s example, New Zealand could consider banning donations from particularly high-risk sectors where government decisions directly affect commercial fortunes – property developers, mining/extraction companies, gambling, alcohol, etc.

At the very least, during periods of active decision-making (say a pending fast-track application or a tender), those involved could be barred from donating to avoid “pay-to-play” suspicions. This would be a way of institutionalising conflict management, treating certain donations like disqualifying interests for a defined time.

6) Introduce Pay-to-Play restrictions

The US has a complex campaign finance system with high donation limits and Super PACs, but one useful concept from American governance is “pay-to-play” restrictions at the state and local level. Many US states and cities have laws that prohibit government contractors or bidders from donating to the officials who decide on their contracts. The idea is to break any implied link between contributions and receiving government business. For instance, a state might bar a construction firm from donating to the governor or ministers if that firm is concurrently seeking state contracts.

These targeted rules in the US aim to prevent specific conflicts in procurement and contracting – analogous in some ways to preventing donors from buying their way onto a fast-track project list. New Zealand doesn’t have an exact parallel, but the principle could apply: if you’re asking the government for a favour or concession (like a fast-track approval), maybe you shouldn’t be allowed to give them money around the same time.

7) Strengthen participatory decision-making

A more structural solution, as suggested by environmental groups, is to rely less on discretionary ministerial judgment in such processes in the first place. The Fast Track Act concentrated power in 3 ministers (Bishop, Jones, Brown) for final decisions. As others and I have argued before, this is simply a recipe for lobbying and undue influence behind closed doors.

The Fast Tract Act should be replaced by a more inclusive consent process where the public and independent experts have a say – effectively diffusing the ability of any one politician to quietly slip in a favour for a mate or donor. Despite any flaws, the normal resource management process allows full scrutiny of proposals, whereas leaving it to ministers invites shadowy dealings.

What’s clear is that doing nothing should not be an option. The current controversy over fast-track approvals is a flashing warning sign. Public cynicism is growing – people are openly asking if our politicians are “on the take” (even if legally via donations) or if policies are effectively for sale.

New Zealand owes it to itself to tighten the ship – to update our Cabinet Manual, electoral finance laws, and conflict of interest practices to meet the challenges of modern political financing. There is no single magic bullet: a combination of clearer rules, greater transparency, independent oversight, and possibly bold reforms of donations rules will be needed to restore full confidence.

Fast-tracking development should not mean fast-tracking the erosion of public trust. By confronting these conflicts of interest head-on and enacting reforms, we can ensure that government decisions are made on merit – and are seen to be made on merit – rather than under the shadow of money.

Dr Bryce Edwards

Director of The Integrity Institute